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1. Introduction
A commercial defendant in a recent lawsuit had a policy of retaining all
of its electronically stored data.' This policy caused the defendant to amass
thousands of gigabytes of backup files spanning a period in excess of ten
years.2 During the course of litigation, the defendant learned that this elec-
tronic data was subject to discovery Consequently, the court ordered the
defendant to review the stored backup data and to produce all relevant infor-
mation contained on those backup tapes.4 This extensive technical discovery
required the defendant to hire special experts to aid in the production process.'
Ultimately, the defendant incurred costs in excess of three million dollars in
order to comply with this single discovery request.'
1. See Genne Rosenberg,ElectronicDiscoveryProvesEffectiveLegal Weapon, J. REC.,
Apr. 27,1997, available in 1997 WL 14390671 (providing summary of case to illustrate serious
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Electronic discovery has become a "mini-industry ' in the legal field,
with that aspect of the discovery process having a significant impact on the
results of numerous cases.8 Electronically stored data has become a prime
source of evidence in litigation because of the increasing use of computer
technology. 9 Recent industry surveys reveal that approximately thirty percent
of all current discovery requests involve electronically stored data. 0 Requests
for electronically stored data undoubtedly will increase because experts esti-
mate that today's computer users never actually print out in paper form almost
one-third of all electronically stored data." Discovery of electronically stored
data is essential because litigants would not find much of this information
through traditional paper discovery processes.'2 To the average person, dis-
covery requests for electronically stored data might seem to involve only the
simple and inexpensive task of inserting a disk into a hard drive and copying
selected files. Yet a closer look at the matter reveals an extremely technical
and exceedingly expensive process that creates many perplexing problems in
the pretrial stages of litigation.
This Note explores the problems that the increase in electronic data
discovery has created in litigation. Specifically, this Note focuses on the cost-
allocation issues involved with the discovery of electronically stored data.
Part H of this Note provides a background discussion ofthe technical, practi-
cal, and legal aspects of the issue. 3 It discusses the factors that contribute to
the excessive costs involved in the discovery of electronically stored data, it
explores the inherent differences between traditional paper discovery and
electronic data discovery, and it analyzes the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
7. Id.
8. See id. (explaining effect of computer age on electronic data storage and electronic
data discovery).
9. See Ron Chepesiuk, Trial by E-Mail, STuDENT LAW., Sept. 1998, at 31, 31-32
(considering impact of heightened use of computer technology on legal profession, specifically
lifigation-related matters).
10. Id, at32.
11. See Monte E. Sokol & Philip P. Andriola, Cyberspace Becomes Ground Zero in
Discovery Process and at Trial, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 1, 1997, at S5 (discussing various legal issues
surrounding electronically stored data, such as privacy rights, discovery costs, and client
counseling).
12. See id. (stating that 90% of all businesses with over 1000 employees rely on e-mail,
but individuals never print 20 to 30% of electronically stored data); see also James J. Marcellino
& Anthony A. Bongiomo, E-Mail Is the Hottest Topic in Discovery Disputes: One Litigant
Seeks Facts Buried in a Data Base; the Other Seeks to Avoid Burdens of Production, NAT'L
L.J., Nov. 3, 1997, at B10 (explaining that 20 to 30% of computerized information never
reaches paper form (citing Paul Frisman, E-Mail: Dial 'E'for Evidence, N.J. L.J., Dec. 25,
1995, at 12)).
13. See infra Part H (providing background information regarding discovery of electroni-
caly stored data).
57 WASH. &LEE . REV 257 (2000)
that apply to discovery of electronically stored data. 14 Part III examines the
likely sources of the problems surrounding the discovery of electronically
stored data and contains detailed discussions and analyses of the cases in
which courts have dealt with discovery requests for such data. 5 Part IV gives
three specific recommendations to remedy the problems surrounding the allo-
cation of discovery costs of electronically stored data. 16 In addition, Part IV
explains the need for these changes and the specific manner in which they will
solve the current problems. 7 Finally, Part V summarizes the pertinent issues
and recommendations and concludes that, regardless of the exact remedy
chosen, the time has come to bring the judiciary and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure into the computer age.' 8
.. Background
A. The Importance of Obtaining the Electronic Form of a Document
Experts estimate that computer users never convert up to thirty percent
of all electronically stored documents into paper form. 9 This fact is signifi-
cant because litigants who fail to request electronic data will never find many
files through traditional means of paper discovery. Additionally, the elec-
tronic version of a document may provide an individual with much more
information than its paper counterpart.2" For example, a paper printout of an
electronic mail (e-mail) message simply contains the names of the sender and
the receiver, the text of the message, and the date and the time that the sender
sent the message." An electronic copy of the same e-mail message may
reveal not only the above information, but also the date and the time that
the recipient received the message, whether the recipient actually "opened"
the message, and also to whom, if anyone, the recipient forwarded the mes-
14. See infra Parts IIA-D (providing background discussion of technical, practical, and
legal aspects of discovery of electronically stored data).
15. See infra Part Iff (discussing and analyzing pertinent cases).
16. See infra Part IV (giving recommendations to solve problems surrounding allocation
of discovery costs of electronically stored data).
17. See infra Part IV (discussing recommendations to solve electronic data discovery cost
issues and explaining manner in which those recommendations will remedy current problems).
18. See infra Part V (providing summary and conclusion).
19. Sokol &Andriola, supra note 11.
20. See Karen L. Hagberg & A. Max Olson, Shadow Data, E-Mail Play a Key Role in
Discover, Trial, N.Y. L.J., June 16, 1997, at S3 (discussing differences between paper and
electronic versions of documents); see also Charles A. Lovell & Roger W. Holmes, The
Dangers ofE-Mail: The Need for Electronic Data Retention Policies, R.I. B., Dec. 1995, at
7, 7 (explaining that computer printouts do not contain complete information that computer's
memory stores).
21. See Hagberg & Olson, supra note 20 (describing specific content of paper copy of e-
mail message and electronic copy of same message).
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sage.' In addition, computer experts often have the ability to determine the
exact terminal within a network from which the sender sent the message.'s
Such information has proven critical in some cases.24
Aside from e-mail, electronic versions of other types of documents also
are important to litigants today.2 For example, electronic data discovery has
become a significant tool in contractual disputes because experts can restore
previous versions of contracts from backup tapes.26 These restored versions
of contracts may reveal many important details about the parties' agreement,
such as the intent of the parties.27 Litigants might never find this type of
important information through traditional paper discovery because it is
unlikely that a party would print out and retain every preliminary draft of a
document.' Therefore, it is often imperative that litigants obtain electronic
versions of pertinent documents to ensure that they rely on the most accurate
information concerning their cases. However, electronic data is considerably
more expensive to produce than mere paper documents.' The sheer costliness
22. See id. (describing difference between paper copy and electronic copy of same e-mail
message).
23. See Chepesiuk, supra note 9, at 31 (discussing recent case in which defendant
prevailed through use of electronic version of e-mail message that computer experts were able
to retrieve). In that case, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant corporation terminated her
employment because she ended a romantic relationship with the corporate defendant's CEO.
Id. The plaintiff presented a paper copy of an incriminating e-mail from the CEO indicating that
he personally ordered her termination. Id. Yet computer experts were able to determine,
through the electronic version of the same document, that the plaintiff had actually sent the
message to herself using the defendant's computer password. Id. The defendant prevailed but
only after expending a vast amount of money on electronic data discovery in order to find the
proverbial "smoking gun." Id.; see Janet Novack, control/alt/discover, FORBES, Jan. 13, 1997,
at 60, 60 (addressing same case facts).
24. See supra note 23 (discussing facts of case in which electronic version of document
proved critical).
25. See Hagberg & Olson, supra note 20 (emphasizing value of electronic versions of
documents); Lovell & Holmes, supra note 20, at 8 (discussing importance of retrieval of
previously deleted documents).
26. See Hagberg & Olson, supra note 20 (mentioning importance of computer data as vast
source of discovery for drafts of documents and other sensitive correspondence); Lovell &
Holmes, supra note 20, at 8 (discussing case in which previously deleted draft of agreement
revealed valuable information).
27. See Lovell & Holmes, supra note 20, at 8 (reporting case in which producing party
retrieved 27 drafts of disputed agreement that provided insight into intent of parties).
28. See Lovell & Holmes, supra note 20, at 7 (discussing importance of discovery of
electronic versions of documents as opposed to mere printouts); Sokol & Andriola, supra note
11 (stating that much electronically stored data is never reproduced in paper form).
29. See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94CIV.2120 (LMM) (AJP), 1995 WL
649934, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1995) (explaining that requesting party or court can require
producing party to design computer programs to extract electronic data from its computer
network or backup tapes).
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surrounding the discovery of electronically stored data has caused many
significant problems in litigation.3"
B. Factors Contributing to the Excessive Discovery Costs of
Electronically Stored Data
At least three factors contribute to the excessive costs of discovery of
electronically stored data. First, the discovery of electronic information is
extremely costly because individuals and companies tend to retain greater
quantities of electronically stored data than data stored in paper form.
Specifically, unlike paper copies of documents that can fill numerous rooms
and warehouses, electronically stored data takes up very little physical space. 2
Because computer users can store enormous amounts of information in
extremely small spaces, they tend to allow data to linger for longer in a com-
pany's network and on backup tapes than they would if they stored the data
in paper form. 33 Even though many companies and individuals continue to
store paper copies of various documents, it is important to recognize that even
if a litigant properly makes the information available to the requesting party
in paper form, an adversary still can demand the same information in a usable
electronic format.34 A requirement that the data be in electronic form also
increases the cost of discovery because production often can entail creating
complex computer programs to convert the electronic data from its current
format to an electronic format that the requesting party can use.3
30. See infra Part LD (discussing problems that costliness of discovery of electronically
stored data has caused for litigants).
31. See Hagberg & Olson, supra note 20 (explaining difficulties of purging electronic
data and prevalence of backup copies of such data).
32. See id. (discussing importance of electronically stored information in litigation and
problems surrounding such information); see also Rosenberg, supra note 1 (reporting that one
1 0-inch hard-drive can store more information than entire floor of building).
33. See Hagberg & Olson, supra note 20 (commenting that although many companies
have document retention programs, few enforce them regarding their computer systems).
34. SeeAnti-Monopoy, 1995 WL 649934, at *1 (explaining that parties can discover data
in computerized form, even if producing party already has produced paper copies of same
information). In Anti-Monopoly, the plaintiff filed a motion to compel production of certain
data processing files from the defendants. Id. The defendants objected, claiming that they had
produced the data in paper format and should not have to produce the data in computer form.
Id. The defendants argued that complying with the request for electronic data would entail
recreating the information at substantial expense because the requested reports no longer existed
in electronic format. Id. However, the court emphasized that the rule is clear that "production
of information in 'hard copy' documentary form does not preclude a party from receiving that
same information in computerized/electronic form." Id. at *2.
35. See id. (explaining that court can require producing party to design computer program
to extract electronic data from its computer network or backup tapes). For example, a producing
party may possess electronic data stored in a format that the requesting party is unable to use.
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Second, the discovery of electronically stored data is exceedingly expen-
sive in part because many individuals and most companies use magnetic tapes
to store backup versions of their computer networks.3 6 These magnetic tapes
can hold vast amounts of data;37 for example, a single eight-millimeter backup
tape can maintain the equivalent of 1500 boxes ofpaper. 8 Moreover, because
many companies never reuse or destroy these backup tapes, the unlimited data
retention makes the information indefinitely available for discovery.39 Conse-
quently, the amount of electronically stored data that is subject to discovery
can be astronomical.4" In most cases, litigants must hire special experts to
Often this occurs because one party utilizes an outdated computer system on which it is unable
to work with the requested data in its current electronic format or because the producing party
possesses the data on backup tapes from an obsolete computer system. In either case, the
producing party would have to create a specialized computer program to convert the electronic
data from its current format into a format with which the requesting party can work. However,
such processes are often extremely costly. Id.
36. See Hagberg & Olson, supra note 20 (discussing differences between paper data
storage and electronic data storage).
37. See id. (explaining differences between electronic version of document and mere
paper version of document); see also Marcellino & Bongiomo, supra note 12 (discussing
numerous factors contributing to excessive costs of discovery of electronically stored data).
38. See Marcellino & Bongiomo, supra note 12 (discussing companies' ability to retain
vast amounts of data on computer backup tapes).
39. See id. (explaining tendency ofe-mailto "proliferate" and difficulty of deleting it).
40. SeeABalancingAct: Determining the ProperLevel ofElectronic Data Preservation,
RECENT DEvs. (Electronic Evidence Discovery, Inc.), June 1998, at 1, 1-3 [hereinafter A
Balancing Act] (discussing problems relating to preservation of electronic data); Lovell &
Holmes, supra note 20, at 8 (considering data retention issues involving electronically stored
data); Novack, supra note 23, at 60 (presenting legal issues surrounding retention of electroni-
cally stored data); Daryll R. Prescott et al., Electronic Data Balancing Act: Preserve or
Delete?, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 17, 1998, at B7 (discussing litigation problems created by retention
or lack thereof of electronically stored data).
Although most companies have data retention policies in effect regarding the retention
of paper documents, many companies have overlooked the importance of retention policies
regarding computer data. See Lovell & Holmes, supra note 20, at 8 (discussing positive aspects
of instituting electronic data retention policies). Some companies that have instituted electronic
data retention policies believe it is necessary to preserve everything and, thus, institute total
preservation policies. See Prescott et al., supra (discussing various ramifications of maintaining
total preservation electronic data retention policy). Although total preservation policies seem
cautious, they are exceedingly costly and typically unnecessary. Id. On the other hand, some
companies have instituted complex data preservation policies whereby they purge electronic
data from their systems on a routine basis. See Lovell & Holmes, supra note 20, at 8 (discuss-
ing positive aspects of maintaining well planned rotational data retention policy). However,
courts have severely punished defendants for the inadvertent destruction of electronically stored
data that resulted from a company's regular data purging schedule. See Prescott et al., supra
(discussing recent cases in which courts have imposed harsh sanctions for inadvertent destruc-
tion of evidence in accordance with standard data retention.policy). These decisions send mixed
signals to many companies and make it nearly impossible for them to determine the correct
course to take regarding retention of electronically stored data. See A Balancing Act, supra, at
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search through the enormous amount of data contained in their computer
network and on backup tapes in order to separate the relevant and discover-
able data from that which either is irrelevant or is protected from discovery.41
In addition, eventhough many computer systems and backup systems that com-
panies utilized in the past have become obsolete, adversaries still can discover
the data contained on disks and backup tapes from those obsolete systems.42
In these situations, litigants must hire computer experts to convert these func-
tionally antiquated files into usable form in order to comply with the rules of
discovery.43 This too carries a hefty price.'
A third factor contributing to the excessive costs of discovery of electron-
ically stored data involves the manner in which files are deleted from a com-
puter.4' A great number of computer users are under the impression that once
they delete a file, that file is gone forever;46 however, this is usually not the
case.47 Deleting a file simply allows the computer to overwrite the file and to
remove it from the directory.4" Therefore, often unknown to the user, instead
of being immediately overwritten and purged from the system, "deleted" files
remain in the computer until the computer needs that space for new data.49
1-3 (discussing recent case providing insight into determining correct amount of data retention).
As a result, many companies simply "play it safe" and preserve everything. Id.
41. See LawrenceAragon, E-MailIs NotBeyond the Law, PC WY., Oct 6,1997, at 111,
112 (discussing various costs associated with searching company's backup tapes).
42. See id. (listing different factors contributing to excessive costs of electronic data
discovery).
43. See id. (discussing process of converting files from obsolete computer systems to
current computer systems).
44. See id. (discussing expenses associated with restoring "ancient" data from backup
systems).
45. See Hagberg & Olson, supra note 20 (considering numerous factors contributing to
excessive costs of discovery of electronically stored data, including inadvertent data retention);
Marcellino & Bongiomo, supra note 12 (same).
46. See Hagberg & Olson, supra note 20 (explaining that numerous factors contribute to
excessive costs of electronically stored data discovery, including inadvertent data retention);
Marcellino & Bongiorno, supra note 12 (discussing various factors contributing to excessive
costs of discovery of electronically stored data); Rosenberg, supra note 1 (same).
47. See Rosenberg, supra note 1 (discussing preservation and retrieval of previously
deleted documents). "The fact that 'deleted' documents are often preserved in computer hard
drives and on back-up tapes came to public attention a decade ago during the Iran-Contra
scandal." Id.; see Bruce Rubenstein, Electronic Discovery Costs Are Leveraging Settlements,
CoRP. LEGAL TIMES, Sept 1997, at 26,26 (describing Iran-Contra as step toward awareness of
retrieval of previously deleted data).
48. See Marcellino & Bongiomo, supra note 12 (explaining process by which computers
replace "deleted" data with new data)..
49. See id. (discussing process through which computers overwrite previously deleted
data with new data). Marcellino and Bongionmo emphasize that adversaries may discover the
"deleted" data remaining in the computer. Id.
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Litigants can hire computer experts to restore these previously "deleted" files
even years after the supposed deletion of the files, but this procedure can be
extremely costly." In addition, even when new data overwrites these docu-
ments, electronic copies ofthe files often remain on the network backup tapes
and thus are subject to discovery.51
C. Procedures Required in the Discovery ofElectronically Stored Data
Although some companies specialize in discovery of electronically stored
data, their services are extremely costly. 2 For example, one company that
specializes in this type of work explained that if a client must review data
contained in twelve monthly backup tapes, it must consider electronic discov-
ery costs that include both person hours and machine hours. 3 That company
estimated that if a client seeks to restore e-mail messages contained in a year's
worth of its monthly backup sessions, the retrieval costs include an estimated
one hundred person hours to restore the monthly sessions to a computer drive
and an additional estimated 250 person hours to redact the data to eliminate
duplicate messages.5 4 The costs of that project also include 250 person hours
to convert the messages to text in order to facilitate a search and manipulation
of the data. 5 Furthermore, it takes approximately sixty person hours to search
and print the necessary data. 6 Experts estimate their fees at an average of
$150 per hour; thus, the total cost of the aforementioned electronic data dis-
covery is nearly $100,000.: More recently, however, commentators have
reported numerous instances in which plaintiffs have presented defendants
with electronic data discovery requests with which compliance would cost
approximately a million dollars or more." Moreover, as mentioned in the
introduction,59 in one extreme example, the plaintiff forced the defendant to
50. See Hagberg & Olson, supra note 20 (discussing retrieval of previously deleted files
in discovery); Marcellino and Bomgiomo, supra note 12 (same).
51. See Hagberg & Olson, supra note 20 (explaining prevalence of computer backup
systems).
52. See Aragon, supra note 41, at 112 (discussing discovery costs and procedures
specifically involving retrieval of e-mail).
53. See id. (outlining electronic discovery costs incurred to review e-mail messages





58. See Chepesuik, supra note 9, at 33 (discussing exceeding costs of complying with
electronic data discovery requests); Rubenstein, supra note 47, at 26 (discussing skyrocketing
costs of litigation due to advent of electronic data storage).
59. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text (describing case in which defendant had
to produce electronically stored data spanning period exceeding 10 years).
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review and to produce electronically stored data contained on backup tapes
spanning a period exceeding ten years.6' Complying with this extensive dis-
covery request cost the producing party several million dollars.61
D. Problems Created by the Discovery Rules
Although modem technology has led to many positive changes and has
created numerous advantages in the litigation process, it also has created some
negative side effects because of the vast increase in the use of electronically
stored data in litigation.62 Many of these problems stem from the broad
wording of the general rules applicable to electronic data discovery and from
the way in which judges have applied these rules to electronic data discovery
issues.6' Thus, it is imperative to understand the procedural rules that cur-
rently provide the basis for determining which party bears the cost of produc-
ing electronic data for discovery.
1. Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a party to
request production of electronically stored data.' The rule states that "[a]ny
party may serve on any other party a request ... to produce ... any desig-
nated documents (including writings, . . . and other data compilations from
which information can be obtained, translated, if necessary, by the respondent
through detection devices into reasonably usable form).""5 The 1970 Advisory
Committee Notes to the rule make clear that Rule 34 applies to electronic data
compilations. The Advisory Committee Notes emphasize that they intend
the descriptive definition of the term "documents" within Rule 34 to adapt to
changes in technology.67 The Notes also explain that the burden of complying
60. See Hagberg & Olson, supra note 20 (mentioning exceedingly expensive discovery
costs of retrieving and producing electronically stored data); Rosenberg, supra note 1 (high-
lighting case in which plaintiff forced defendant to review backup tapes covering over 10 years
and to produce relevant data at cost of more than $3 million).
61. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text (discussing example in which defendant
incurred several million dollars in electronically stored data discovery costs).
62. See generally Hagberg & Olson, supra note 20 (discussing problems that use of elec-
tronically stored data in discovery can cause); Novack, supra note 23 (same); Rosenberg, supra
note 1 (same); Sokol & Andriola, supra note 11 (same).
63. See infra Part ll.D.1-2 (discussing current discovery rules and judiciary's application
of those rules).
64. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (addressing production of documents for inspection and other
purposes).
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. See FED. R. Civ. P.34 advisory committee's notes (1970 Amendment) (explaining that
Rule 34 applies to discovery of electronic data compilations).
67. See id. (noting that definition of"documents" is meant "to accord with changing tech-
nology").
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with a discovery request for electronically stored data rests on the producing
party.' When confronted with cases involving the discovery costs of elec-
tronically stored data, courts typically have considered this provision to be the
general rule regarding the allocation of those discovery costs. 9
Consequently, when applying Rule 34 in cases involving discovery of
electronically stored data, the majority of courts have required that the produc-
ing party bear all the costs involved in complying with discovery requests for
computer data.o Although this rule seems reasonable on the surface, it has led
to numerous problems in the discovery process." The most frequent problem
surrounding the general rule is that the sheer breadth of the rule has opened the
door to a new means of abusing the discovery process.72 With increasing
68. See id. (explaining that respondent bears burden of production of electronically stored
data, but courts can shift costs to discovering party under Rule 26(c)).
69. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 997,
1995 WL 360526, at *2 (N.D. fI1. June 15, 1995) (explaining that even in instances in which
producing party must translate electronic data into form usable by requesting party, producing
party should bear costs involved). In this case, the court explained that "'[tihe normal and
reasonable translation of electronic data into a form usable by the discovering party should be
the ordinary and foreseeable burden of a respondent'" Id. (quoting Daewoo Elecs. Co. v.
United States, 650 F. Supp. 1003, 1006 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986)); see Sanders v. Levy, 558 F.2d
636, 650 (2d Cir. 1977) (en bane) (discussing general rule applicable to discovery of electroni-
cally stored data), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437
U.S. 340 (1978). In Sanders, the court explained that "the general rule [is]: 'The responding
party who is required to prepare a printout or otherwise make the data reasonably usable for the
discovering party must ordinarily bear the expense of doing this."'" Id. (quoting 8 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHm R MILLER, FEDERALPRAcTIcE AND PROCEDURE § 2218 (1970)).
70. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 1995 WL 360526, at *1, *3 (requiring
defendant to retrieve requested electronically stored data at cost estimated at $50,000 to
$70,000); Sanders, 558 F.2d at 650 (discussing general rule applicable to discovery of electroni-
caly stored data); Lovell & Holmes, supra note 20, at 9 (mentioning tradition that parties are
responsible for their own discovery costs). In Sanders, the court of appeals upheld the district
court's denial of the defendant's Rule 26(c) motion to shift the burden of cost of obtaining
electronically stored data to the plaintiff. Sanders, 558 F.2d at 650.
71. See Mark D. Robins, Computers and the Discovery ofEvidence -A New Dimension
to CivilProcedure, 17 J. MARSHAiL J. CoMPYrER& INFo. L. 411,477 (1999) (stating that "the
framework of Rule... 34 does not fit aptly to the discovery of computer-related evidence");
Hagberg & Olson, supra note 20 (mentioning problem involving plaintiffs using discovery rules
to harass defendants); Marcellino & Bongiomo, supra note 12 (asserting potential for abuse of
discovery rules involving electronically stored data requests); Novack, supra note 23, at 60
(discussing problems surrounding discovery of electronically stored data); Rosenberg, supra
note 1 (pointing to use of electronically stored data discovery requests as negotiation tool).
72. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (governing production of documents for inspection by adver-
sary); see also Hagberg & Olson, supra note 20 (mentioning problem involving plaintiffs using
discovery rules to harass defendants); Marcellino & Bongiorno, supra note 12 (discussing
potential for abuse of discovery rules involving electronically stored data requests); Novack,
supra note 23, at 60 (focusing on problems surrounding discovery of electronically stored data);
Rosenberg, supra note 1 (pointing out use of electronically stored data discovery requests as
negotiation tool).
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frequency, plaintiffs are using Rule 34 to force defendants into settlement.7
3
Plaintiffs often present defendants with extremelybroad discovery requests for
electronically stored data - compliance with which would cost the defendants
enormous amounts of money.74 The prospect of fiflfilling these expensive
discovery requests forces many defendants to settle rather than incur such
tremendous costs at a very early stage of the litigation process."
2. Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
To avoid harsh results under Rule 34, litigants may use Rule 26(c) to
attempt to shift the cost of production to the requesting party.7 6 Rule 26(c)
provides that "dhe court ... may make any order which justice requires to
73. See Aragon, supra note 41, at 111 (discussing instance in which defendant chose to
settle rather than to incur enormous electronic data discovery costs); Hagberg & Olson, supra
note 20 (discussing problem involving plaintiffs using discovery rules to harass defendants);
Marcellino & Bongioro, supra note 12 (discussing potential for abuse of discovery rules
involving electronically stored data requests); Novack, supra note 23,.at 60 (referring to use of
cost of electronic data discovery to force settlement as "blackmail"); Rosenberg, supra note 1
(discussing use of electronically stored data discovery requests as negotiation tool). Aragon
cites one instance in which a corporate defendant faced an electronic data discovery request that
cost between $500,000 and $750,000. Aragon, supra note 41, at 111. The defendant was not
as concerned with whether or not the requested backup tapes contained detrimental data as it
was with the enormous burden of complying with such a discovery request Id. Ultimately,
"[t]he huge tab weighed on the company's decision to settle the case." Id.
74. See Chepesiuk, supra note 9, at 33 (discussing instances in which plaintiffs took
advantage of breadth of discovery rules by requesting that defendants conduct extensive and
extremely costly electronic data discovery); Hagberg & Olson, supra note 20 (mentioning recent
case in which court ordered defendant to review and produce 10 years worth of backup tapes
at cost of more than $3 million); Novack, supra note 23, at 60 (discussing case in which court
forced defendant to search 50,000 backup tapes, costing defendant more than $1 million);
Rosenberg, supra note 1 (giving example of instance in which plaintiff forced defendant to
conduct extremely expensive electronic data discovery). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (governing
production of documents for inspection by adversary). This rule states that a party may request
an adversary to produce any designated documents, and the producing party must present the
requested documents in "reasonably usable form." Id. When interpreted broadly, Rule 34
allows parties to request large volumes of electronically stored data. As a result, the respondent
must bear the costs of locating the requested data, possibly restoring much of the data, and
translating the data into a form that the requesting party can use.
75. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing plaintiffs' use of discovery rules
as settlement tools and providing example of situation in which enormous electronic data
discovery request forced defendant to settle lawsuit).
76. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (providing means by which producing party may obtain
relief upon showing that discovery request creates undue burden or expense); see also FED. R.
Civ. P. 34 advisory committee's notes (1970 Amendment) (explaining that although Rule 34
places burden of cost of complying with discovery request on respondent, courts have ample
power under Rule 26(c) to protect respondent against undue burden or expense). The Advisory
Committee Notes to Rule 34 further explain that courts have the discretion under Rule 26(c) to
restrict discovery or to require that the discovering party pay the costs. Id.
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protect a party... from... undue burden or expense."77 The Advisory
Committee interpreted Rule 26(c) as providing courts with ample discretion
to protect a respondent against the undue burden or expense that might result
from an overly broad discovery request. 8
Although Rule 26(c) seems to provide a solution to the problem of dis-
covery abuse surrounding requests for electronically stored data, courts have
been extremely hesitant to exercise the discretion that this burden-shifting rule
affords them.79 In the few cases that involve requests to shift the burden of
cost to the requesting party, the courts have varied greatly in their reasoning,
considering many different factors and emphasizing distinct considerations.8"
Thus, it is uncertain what conditions must be present in order for a court to
find a discovery request for electronically stored data unduly burdensome or
expensive.
8'
When presented with defendants' motions to shift the burden of discovery
of electronically store4 data, most courts simply have denied these motions,
even when the costs involved have been exorbitant.' In explaining their
reasons for refusing to shift the burden of cost to the requesting party these
77. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
78. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee's notes (1970 Amendment) (explaining that
Rule 26(c) gives courts ample power to protect respondents against undue burden or expense
by restricting discovery or shifting burden of cost to requesting party).
79. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94 C 897, MDL 997,
1995 WL 360526, at *3 (N.D. M11. June 15, 1995) (refusing to shift burden of cost of discovery
of electronically stored data to requesting party); Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 462-
64 (D. Utah 1985) (refusing to shift discovery costs of electronically stored data to requesting
party).
80. Compare Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94CIV.2120, 1995 WL 649934
(LMM) (AJP), at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1995) (referencing comparison of plaintiff's and defen-
dant's need and cost in time and money as factors for court to consider in determining whether
burden shifting is proper), with In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 1995 WL 360526, at *2
(adopting factors set forth in Bills v. Kennecott Corp., but using different argument to make
decision), and Bills, 108 FR.D. at 463-64 (setting forth four factors for court to consider in
deciding whether to shift burden of cost to requesting party).
81. See Bills, 108 F.R.D. at 462 (recognizing that courts lack sufficient guidance as to
how to determine properly whether situation warrants burden shifting under Rule 26(c)). The
court explained that "[the Advisory Committee] gives the [c]ourt no guidance as to how
properly to determine whether the burden or expense is 'undue' where discovery of computer
stored information is involved." Id.; see Robins, supra note 71, at 482 (explaining that "the
discretionary exercise of a court's authority to allocate costs is inherently uncertain").
82. See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 1995 WL 360526, at *2 (refusing
to shift cost of production to requesting party). In this case, the defendant faced discovery costs
of approximately S70,000 in order to comply with one request, yet the court refused to find such
a request overly burdensome or expensive. Id. at *l. The court reasoned "that the mere fact that
the production of computerized data will result in a substantial expense [to the respondent] is
not a sufficient justification for imposing the costs of production on the requesting party." Id.
at *2.
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courts have failed to recognize the effects of modem technology on litigation.13
Furthermore, in the few instances in which courts have recognized the inequity
of placing the costly burdens on the producing party, the remedies that courts
have prescribed have been inadequate and unreasonable. 4 In some situations,
judges have tackled the cost issue simply by placing the burden of searching
the producing party's computer networks and backup tapes upon the request-
ing party."5 Commentators have criticized this practice because it requires a
litigant to grant an adversary access to its network. 6 Infact, most litigants are
vehemently against this invasive practice because "it's almost like giving
someone the keyto your house."' 7 Others warn that although giving disks and
backup tapes to the adverse party may avoid substantial costs, the producing
party risks waiving its attorney-client privilege and disclosing proprietary
information.88 These "remedies" risk causing more harm than good for defen-
dants - harm that defendants need not initially face.89
I. Case Discussions and Analyses
As the previous discussion illustrates, it is clear that the current state of
the discovery rules and the judiciary's application of those rules in the context
of electronically stored data discovery have created many significant problems
in litigation.' ° As one commentator explained, "Although the Rules provide
tools to allocate such costs, the framework that the Rules provide for cost-
83. See id. (providing reasoning behind decision to deny respondent's request to shift
burden of cost of discovery of electronically stored data to requesting party). In this case, the
court explained that "[ilf a party chooses an electronic storage method, the necessity for a
retrieval program or method is an ordinary and forseeable risk." Id. (emphasis added). The
court further stated that it found it unfair to force the plaintiffs to bear a burden caused by the
defendant's choice of electronic storage. Id.
84. See Hagberg & Olson, supra note 20 (reporting practice of turning over computer
disks and tapes to adversary in order to avoid substantial costs involved in searching such data);
Rosenberg, supra note I (discussing alternative solutions that judges prescribe in order to deal
with issues regarding cost of production of electronically stored data).
85. See Rosenberg, supra note 1 (explaining various ways in which courts have dealt with
discovery cost-allocation issues).
86. See Hagberg & Olson, supra note 20 (considering problems surrounding alternatives
to requiring respondents to bear substantial costs involved in producing electronically stored
data); Rosenberg, supra note 1 (discussing alternative ways in which courts have addressed
allocation of discovery costs of electronically stored data).
87. Rosenberg, supra note 1 (quoting practitioner).
88. See Hagberg & Olson, supra note 20 (criticizing practice of turning over computer
disks and tapes to adversary in order to avoid substantial costs involved in searching such data).
89. See id. (explaining that alternative means of production can cause litigants unneces-
sary harm and present litigants with unnecessary risks).
90. See supra Part I.D (describing numerous problems that current discovery rules and
judiciary's misapplication of those rules have created in dealing with discovery of electronically
stored data).
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allocation in conventional discovery does not precisely fit computer-related
discovery, and the discretion that the Rules afford courts to adjust the alloca-
tion leaves much uncertainty...."" These problems have had severe ramifi-
cations on litigants, both small and large. With the use of computer technol-
ogy steadily increasing, it is important to understand exactly how the judiciary
has dealt with the computer-related issues discussed above. The following
subparts will discuss and analyze some of the case law in which courts have
addressed the allocation of discovery costs of electronically stored data. 2
A. Cases in Which Courts Have Considered Burden Shifting Under
Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Although few opinions involve the issue of shifting the costs of discovery
of electronically stored data, the opinions that are available provide some
insight into the pertinent considerations. Some of these cases stand as exam-
ples of the problems that the judiciary's current application of the relevant
rules of civil procedure create in the context of electronically stored data
discovery.93 These cases illustrate that the current rules and their advisory
committee notes are insufficient because they provide the judiciary with little
guidance on how to apply the rules properly in cases involving electronically
stored data discovery.94 The following cases demonstrate the most common
manner in which the courts have dealt with motions to shift the burden of cost
of electronically stored data under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. These opinions also reveal much of the judiciary's lack of experi-
ence and expertise in dealing with discovery issues involving electronically
stored data.
95
1. Bills v. Kennecott Corp.
In 1985, the United States District Court for the District of Utah decided
Bills v. Kennecott Corp.,96 a well-known case in which a court considered a
motion by the producing party to shift the cost of production of electronically
91. Robins, supra note 71, at 473.
92. See infra Part liTA (considering cases in -which courts have considered burden shift-
ing under Rule 26(c)); infra Part IELB (analyzing cases that involve shifting burden of discovery
costs in order to pinpoint source of problems); infra Part 11.C (examining decisions in which
courts have prescribed alternative means of production or have refused to compel respondents
to bear costs of discovery).
93. See infra notes 96-274 and accompanying text (discussing typical cases in which
courts have tackled electronic data discovery cost-allocation issues).
94. See infra notes 96-274 and accompanying text (analyzing and critiquing cases in
which courts have dealt with electronic data discovery cost-allocation issues).
95. See infra notes 96-274 and accompanying text (discussing major cases in which courts
have addressed issue of electronic data discovery).
96. 108 F.R.D. 459 (D. Utah 1985).
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stored data to the requesting party. 7 Bills involved an age discrimination suit
that a group of former employees brought against the defendant corporation."
During the course of discovery, the plaintiffs requested production of docu-
ments that contained detailed information regarding a number of employees
at Kennecott's Utah operations. 9 The defendant offered to comply with the
discovery request by providing the plaintiffs with either a computer tape or a
printout of the requested data, but it refused to do so at its own expense."°° The
plaintiffs would not pay the costs associated with production of the requested
data absent a court order to do so."° Ultimately, the defendant produced the
requested data, but it also filed a motion asking the court to exercise its discre-
tion under Rule 26(c) by issuing an order requiring the plaintiffs to pay the
$5,411.25 incurred in complying with the discovery request."
The main issue in Bills was whether the discovery request in question
was so unduly burdensome or expensive that it warranted shifting the burden
of cost to the requesting party under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
97. See Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459,464 (D. Utah 1985) (concluding that
court should not shift cost of production of electronically stored data to plaintiffs). In Bills, the
underlying dispute involved a wrongful termination action that a group of former employees
brought against the defendant corporation. Id. at 460. The discovery request at issue sought
the production of documents containing detailed information regarding numerous employees
at Kennecott's Utah operations. Id. This discovery request cost the defendant $5,411.25. Id.
In considering the defendant's motion for an order requiring the plaintiffs to bear the costs of
discovery, the court contemplated whether it was appropriate under the circumstances to
exercise its discretion under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and to shift the
burden of cost to the plaintiffs in order to protect the defendant from undue expense. Id. at 461-
64. At the heart of the court's analysis was the determination of what constitutes an undue
expense in the context of computer stored data for the purposes of Rule 26(c) burden shifting.
Id. at 462-64. The court decided that it should balance the expense and burden to the respond-
ing party against the relative expense and burden to the requesting party in addition to determin-
ing whether such burden was excessive. Iah at 463. The court relied on four factors in deciding
to deny the defendant's request to shift the burden of cost to the plaintiffs in this case. Id. at
464. First, the court looked at the amount of money involved and determined that such sum was
neither excessive nor inordinate. Id. Second, the court weighed the relative expense and burden
of obtaining the requested data between the plaintiff and defendant and determined that both
the burden and expense would be greater to the plaintiffs in this case than to the defendant Id.
Third, the court took into account the financial position of the plaintiffs and determined that the
amount of money required to comply with the discovery request in question would be a substan-
tial burden to the plaintiffs. Id. Finally, the court considered whether the responding party
would benefit at all by producing the data in question; it determined that the defendant would
benefit to some degree by producing the data requested. Id. Thus, the court refused to shift the
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Procedure. °3 In considering the issue, the Bills court recognized the impor-
tant impact that computers have had on litigation in general and on discovery
in particular."°4 It also addressed the significant cost-allocation differences
inherent in discovery of electronically stored data versus discovery of paper
documents. 5 The court explained that because of these differences, parties
presented with requests to produce electronically stored data must shoulder
the burden of showing undue expense before courts will shift the costs to the
requesting party."°
In determining exactly what constitutes an undue expense, the court
emphasized that although the Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure address the issue of burden shifting based on undue burden
or expense, the committee failed to give courts guidance on how to determine
properly whether a burden or expense is undue in the context of electronically
stored data.' Before setting forth the factors it considered in its ultimate
decision, the court explained that it was not attempting to set forth an "iron-
clad formula! '' c for determining the definition and the scope of "undue" under
the applicable federal rules.1' 9 Rather, the court explained that the judiciary
should resolve these questions on a case-by-case basis."0 However, the court
noted that certain propositions, such as the general rule that the producing
party pays, should apply in nearly all cases."' The court ultimately estab-
lished a number of factors that it found persuasive in determining whether the
discovery request in question placed an undue burden or expense on the
defendant such that it warranted shifting the costs of discovery to the request-
ing party.1'2
The court explained that it is proper to balance the expense and burden
on the responding party against the relative expense and burden on the re-
103. Id.
104. Id. at 461-66. The court noted that "[c]omputers have become so commonplace that
most court battles now involve discovery of some type of computer-stored information." Id. at
462.
105. Id. The court explained that "[a] lthough parties in the past have been able sometimes
to shift the majority of the costs of document production to the requesting party merely by
making records available for inspection, that cost-shifting tactic is less available... when the




109. Id. The court explained that in its opinion, "[s]uch a formula would be judicially
imprudent and wholly impractical in view of the diverse nature of the claims, discovery requests
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questing party in addition to determining whether the burden is excessive."'
The Bills court concluded that the relative expense and burden in producing
the requested data would be significantly greater to the plaintiff than to the
defendant.11 4 Next, the court looked at the amount of money involved and
determined that $5,411.25 was neither excessive nor inordinate.115 In addi-
tion, the court asserted that the expense would be a substantial burden to the
plaintiffs." 6 Finally, the court found it significant that the defendant would
benefit to some degree from producing the requested data." 7 After setting
forth the aforementioned factors and conducting its analysis, the court refused
to shift the burden of cost to the requesting party.1 Consequently, the court
denied the defendant's motion. 9 In sum, Bills provides an example of the
typical manner in which courts handle requests to shift the burden of discov-
ery costs of electronically stored data.
2. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation
Ten years after Bills, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois decided In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust
Litigation1 20 the most well-known recent case involving the allocation of the








120. Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 997,1995 WL 360526, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995).
121. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 997,
1995 WL 360526, at *3 (N.D. II. June 15, 1995) (requiring defendant to produce computer-
stored data at own expense). In In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, the court considered
whether a discovery request for the defendant's e-mail was untimely, overly-broad, or overly-
burdensome on the defendant, such that it warranted denial of the request, or alternatively,
shifting the burden of cost to the requesting party. Id. at *1. The plaintiffs requested production
of the defendant's e-mail, a request that would cost between $50,000 and $70,000. Id. The
defendant claimed that the court should require the plaintiffs to bear the costs of retrieving the
e-mail because the Manual for Complex Litigation implies that reimbursement is proper in such
circumstances. Id. The court recognized that the manual did lend some support to the defen-
dant's argument, yet after examining relevant case law, it refused to shift the burden of cost to
the plaintiffs. Id. at *2. The court reasoned that "the mere fact that the production of computer-
ized data will result in a substantial expense is not a sufficient justification for imposing the
costs of production on the requesting party." Id. The court considered a number of factors in
making its determination and concluded that "if a party chooses an electronic storage method,
the necessity for a retrieval program or method is an ordinary and foreseeable risk." Id.
Although the court acknowledged that $70,000 in discovery costs is expensive, it failed to find
ALLOCATING DISCOVERY COSTS IN THE COMPUTERAGE 275
tant example of the significant impact that Bills has had on the judiciary's
consideration of electronic data discovery issues. In addition, it illustrates the
common problems that the lack of technical knowledge of much of the judi-
ciary creates in the complicated realm of electronic data discovery allocation.
In In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, the class plaintiffs filed a
motion to compel the defendant, CIBA-Geigy Corporation, to produce elec-
tronically stored e-mail messages in response to a prior discovery request. 122
The defendant agreed that the plaintiffs could discover the requested e-mail,"m
yet refused to produce the requested data. 24 The defendant explained its
refusal by claiming that the plaintiffs' request was "untimely, overly-broad,
and overly-burdensome."' s The defendant argued that the plaintiffs waived
their right to seek the e-mail because they failed to pursue diligently their
original request. 26
In considering the defendant's claims, the court first rejected the argu-
ment that the plaintiffs waived their right to discovery of the requested e-
mail. 27 Second, the court examined the defendant's argument that the court
should shift the costs for retrieving the e-mail to the class plaintiffs.s The
defendant supported its argument by estimating that it had at least thirty
million pages of e-mail stored on backup tapes.'29 The defendant contended
that it would cost approximately fifty to seventy thousand dollars to search the
e-mail data in order to retrieve the appropriate information for discovery.
30
those costs unduly burdensome or excessive. Id. The court further stated that placing the
burden on the defendant was reasonable because the expense of the discovery procedures
involved was a direct result of the defendant's record-keeping system over which the plaintiffs
had no control. Id. The court went even further by referring to the defendant's electronic
storage method as a choice. Id. The court did require the plaintiffs to narrow their request in
an effort to contain costs, but it refused to require the plaintiffs to assume the costs associated
with complying with the discovery request in question. Id. at *3.
122. Id. at*1.
123. Id. The court explained that "Rules 26(b) and 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure instruct that computer-stored information is discoverable under the same rules that
pertain to tangible, written materials." Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. The defendant claimed that the plaintiffs had been dilatory in pursing their e-mail
request and, thus, it denied the defendant discovery of the e-mail. Id.
127. Id. The court agreed that the plaintiffs' efforts in pursuing the e-mail issue were less
than exemplary, but it ultimately concluded that such conduct was not egregious and did not
constitute an abuse of the discovery process. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. The defendant explained that complying with the discovery request in question
would entail searching the e-mail data contained on the backup tapes, eliminating duplicate
messages, compiling, formatting, and retrieving the appropriate data requested. Id.
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In addition, the defendant argued that the Manual for Complex Litigation
proposes that reimbursement is proper in similar situations.
13'
In addressing the defendant's argument regarding the Manual for Com-
plex Litigation,'32 the court reviewed the pertinent sections of the manual; it
acknowledged that the manual did shed some light on the situation and did
lend some support to the defendant's theory that the plaintiffs should bear the
cost of discovery ofthe requested e-mail 3 However, the court explained that
certain case law, specifically Bills v. Kennecott Corp.,'34 was more persuasive
than the Manual for Complex Litigation.131 This case law, the court stated,
provided insight into the determination of whether a discovery request is
unduly burdensome or excessive to the point of warranting a shift in the
burden of production to the requesting party.36
The court relied on cases which establish-thatthe simple fact that produc-
tion of electronically stored data will result in a substantial expense does not
justify imposing the costs of production on the requesting party.137 The court
reasoned that sheer costliness was not enough to render a request for electron-
ically stored data unduly burdensome or excessive. 38 Instead, the court
suggested that it was necessary to consider at least four factors: (1) whether
the amount of money in question was excessive and inordinate; (2) whether
the relative expense and burden in obtaining the data would be greater to the
requesting party than to the responding party; (3) whether the amount of
money in question would be a substantial burden to the requesting party; and
(4) whether the responding party would incur some benefit by producing the
data in question.3 9 However, the court recognized that determinations in the
131. Id.
132. Id. at *2.
133. Id. TheM uALFORCompLExlrrGATION(SECOND) § 21.446(1993) provides that
Parties sometimes request production in a form that can be created only at substan-
tial expense for additional programming, if so, payment of such costs by the
requesting party should be made a condition to production. Indeed, parties obtain-
ing information from another's computerized data typically are required to bear any
special expense incident to this form of production.
Id. at *2 n.1 (quoting MANUALFOR COMPLEX LrrGATION, (SECOND) § 21.446 (1993)).
134. See supra Part IIIAl (discussing Bills v. Kennecott Corp.).
135. In reBrandNamePrescription Drugs, 1995 WL 360526, at *2.
136. Id. The court relied on the factors that the Central Division of the District of Utah
considered in Bills v. Kennecott Corp. in determining whether the cost of complying with the
discovery request at issue was unduly burdensome or expensive. Id.; see infra text accompany-
ing note 139 (setting out Bills factors).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459,464 (D. Utah 1985)). However,
it is important to note that the court in Bills explicitly stated that in setting forth factors in that
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context of retrieval and production of electronically stored data are exceed-
ingly complicated.
40
In weighing the foregoing factors, the court looked at the situation from
the perspectives of both parties.'4 ' Ultimately, the court determined that the
defendants, because they chose an electronic storage method, should bear the
costs necessary to retrieve and produce the requested information.142  The
costs, according to the court, were a product of the defendant's record-keeping
scheme and were a foreseeable risk of maintaining such a storage method. 43
In the court's opinion, forcing the plaintiffs to bear costs that are a product of
a storage method over which they have no control would be unfair."'
The court ultimately denied the defendant's request to shift the burden
of cost of retrieving the electronically stored data to the plaintiffs, but the
court did provide the defendant with some relief.'45 The court required the
plaintiffs to bear any costs associated with printing the selected e-mail files
that the defendant produced. 46 Furthermore, the court required the plaintiffs
to narrow their discovery request in an effort to contain the costs that the
defendant incurred. 47 In the end, however, the court granted the plaintiff's
motion to compel the defendant to produce the requested computer stored data
at its own expense. 48
3. Sanders v. Levy
Over twenty years ago, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit decided Sanders v. Levy, 149 an important case that, although ultimately
case it did not mean for other courts to use those factors as an "ironclad formula" for conducting
burden-shifting analyses. SeeBills, 108 F.R.D. at 463.
140. In reBrandNamePrescription Drugs, 1995 WL 360526, at *2.
141. Id. The court first reasoned that "[o]n the one hand, it seems unfair to force a party
to bear the lofty expense attendant to creating a special computer program for extracting data
responsive to a discovery request." Id. The court also reasoned that "[o]n the other hand, if a
party chooses an electronic storage method, the necessity for a retrieval program or method is





146. Id. The court required the plaintiffs to pay the defendant 21A per page for copies of
documents selected from the defendant's productions. Id.
147. Id. The court explained that the defendant claimed that much of the expense associ-
ated with retrieving and producing the requested e-mail was due to the size of the data set that
the plaintiffs requested. Id.
148. Id.
149. 558 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1977),rev'd sub nom. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437
U.S. 340 (1978).
277
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reversed by the United States Supreme Court, continues to shed some light on
the judiciary's disparate treatment of allocation of electronic data discovery
costs.5 ° Sanders was a class action suit in which the plaintiffs requested that
the defendants produce a list of names and addresses of the class members
from its electronically stored records; they needed the information to properly
notify the class members in accordance with the rules governing class
actions.'51 The district court determined that the rules of discovery, rather
than the class action rules, governed the issue at hand. 52 Thus, it required the
defendants to shoulder the costs of retrieving and producing the requested




150. See Sanders v. Levy, 558 F.2d 636, 646 (2d Cir. 1977) (en bane) (holding that district
court did not abuse its discretion by requiring defendant to bear costs of production of lists that
plaintiffs needed in order to provide individualized notice to class plaintiff members), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978). In Sanders,
the district court required the defendant, Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. (the fund), to produce the
names and addresses of the class plaintiffs so that the plaintiffs could properly notify the mem-
bers of the class. Id. at 647. The fund expended $16,000 in extracting the lists of the names and
addresses of the class members from its computerized records. Id. The defendants appealed the
order of the district court requiring them to bear the burden of costs of retrieving and producing
the class lists; they claimed that such costs were the responsibility of the plaintiffs as part of the
notice requirements under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 647-48. On
rehearing en bane, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the district
court's order requiring the defendants to cull the names and addresses of the class members
from its computer system. Id. at 646. The court explained that the district court acted within
its discretion by requiring that production of the lists be at the defendant's expense. Id. The
court reasoned that Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provided the basis for
requiring the defendants to bear the expense of producing the information contained in their
computer records. Id. at 648. It rejected the defendants' argument that Rule 23 should govern
the request for the class list because it is in essence part of the costs involved in notifying the
class. Id. Rather, the court found that the information that the plaintiffs sought regarding the
names and addresses of the class members was within the broad scope of discovery allowed
under Rule 34. Id. Furthermore, the court found that the district court did not err in failing to
exercise its discretion under Rule 26(c) and shifting the burden of cost to the requesting party.
Id. The court reasoned that the burden that the defendants faced was not unreasonable,
excessive, or unjust Id. In arriving at its conclusion, the court emphasized that it was not
unreasonable or unjust to require a party whose business is vast and complex to bear such a
burden. Id. Thus, the Court of Appeas for the Second Circuit, sitting en bane, found that the
district court did not err in requiring the defendants to bear the burden of cost required to
produce the class lists. Id. at 651. However, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
appellate court's decision, holding that Rule 23 governed the situation at hand, not the rules of
discovery. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 342, 350 (1978). The Supreme
Court concluded that the lower court erred by applying the discovery rules to a situation in
which Rule 23 was clearly the appropriate source of authority. Id. at 350.
151. Sanders, 558 F.2d at 647.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
sitting en banc, addressed the issue of whether the district court acted within
its discretion in ordering the defendants to bear the costs of producing the
names and addresses of the class members."5 4 The defendants claimed that
precedent dictated that the class plaintiffs should be responsible for bearing the
costs of giving notice to the class because notice is an incidental part of class
certification. 5 ' Nonetheless, the court disagreed with the defendant.'56 It
found that Rule 34 ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rather thanthe class
action rules, governed the decisionto require the defendantto bearthe expense
of producing the class list that the plaintiffs requested.5 7 Furthermore, the
Court of Appeals determined that the burden imposed upon the defendant was
not unreasonable because of the nature of the information requested and the
extent and character of the defendant's business.5 8 The court explained that
it found nothing unfair or unjust in requiring large business enterprises to go
to great lengths in order to meet the legitimate requirements of the law. 59
Thus, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
order by finding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to
shift the burden of cost to the plaintiffs under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure."6
On further appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that the rules
governing class actions, not the rules of discovery, provided the appropriate
154. Id. at 648.
155. Id. The defendants claimed thatEisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin held that "'[t]he usual
rule is that a plaintiff must initially bear the cost of notice to the class.... [T]he plaintiff must
pay for the cost of notice as part of the ordinary burden of financing his own suit"' Id. (quoting
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156,178-79 (1974)). The defendants argued that "since
it is prerequisite to sending the notice mandated by [Eisen] that plaintiffs obtain the names and
addresses of those to whom the notice will be sent, Eisen should govern the allocation of the cost
of providing the information." Sanders, 558 F.2d at 647. The court, however, disagreed. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. The court explained that, in its opinion, the lists that the plaintiffs sought were
merely discoverable, electronically stored information. Id. The court further explained that the
information fell "within the broad scope of permissible discovery" set out in the Federal Rules
because it was relevant to the subject matter of the pending action. Id.
158. Id.at650. The court acknowledged that the total expense of $16,000 was rather large,
but it reasoned that identifying each individual shareholder only cost the defendants 130. Id.
159. Id. The court further indicated that it would not expect or require small or simple
businesses to go to the same lengths as large corporations in the same situation. Id. The court
attempted to analogize this disparity to the requirements of the Internal Revenue Service. Id.
The court explained that "Wgreat corporations... must expend millions to provide to the
government information necessary to comply with internal revenue laws; an individual taxpayer
may provide the required information at a cost to himself ofa mere few dollars." Id.
160. Id. at 649-50. The appellate court determined that shifting the burden of cost of
production due to the sheer time and expense involved would be the equivalent of applying an
inflexible rule that the discovering party bear the expense. Id. at 649.
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sources of authority in the case.161 The Court explained that Rule 23 generally
requires a class plaintiff to bear the costs associated with notification of the
class members, but a court has the power to shift these costs to the defendant
in situations in which the defendant is able to perform the tasks involved in
notifying the class more easily than the plaintiff.62 The Supreme Court also
concluded that the present situation did not warrant shifting the burden of cost
to the defendant.163 Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision on the
grounds that the district court and the court of appeals applied the wrong rules
to the case and that it was an abuse of discretion not to require the plaintiffs
to bear the cost of discovery."M
B. Pinpointing the Source of the Problem: Analysis of Cases That
Involve a Shift in the Burden of Discovery Costs
Unsatisfactory outcomes regarding electronically stored data are partly
the result of the judiciary's lack of the necessary familiarity with and knowl-
edge of current computer technology, which are needed to achieve just and
equitable ends.165 The reasoning that the courts provide in many of the cases
161. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 342, 350 (1978). Justice Powell,
writing for the majority, stated: "[W]e hold that Rule 23(d), not the discovery rules, is the
appropriate source of authority for such an order." Id. at 350.
162. Id. at 349-50, 356. The Court explained that "[tihe general rule must be that the
representative plaintiff should perform the tasks, for it is he who seeks to maintain the suit as
a class action and to represent other members of his class." Id. at 356. However, the Court also
explained that "where a defendant can perform one of the tasks necessary to send notice ...
more efficiently than the representative plaintiff, the district court has discretion to order him
to perform the task under Rule 23(d)." Id. at 350.
163. Id. at 350, 362-63.
164. Id. at 350, 364. The Supreme Court explained that "[i]n short, we do not think that
the discovery rules are the right tool for this job." Id. at 354.
165. See Sanders v. Levy, 558 F.2d 636,649 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc) (discussing problems
stemming from courts' lack of knowledge and experience with computer technology), rev'd on
other grounds sub noma. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978). In Sanders,
the court admitted that "computer technology presents discovery problems with which the courts
have developed relatively little familiarity." Id.; see also Chepesiuk, supra note 9, at 36
(explaining that problems regarding decisions involving discovery of electronically stored data
stem from fact that most judges have little experience with today's computer technology).
Chepesiuk illustrates this point by noting "that when the Supreme Court handed down its
decision on the Communications Decency Act in 1997, not one of the justices had ever been on
the Internet." Id.; see Electronic vs. Paper: Determining the Proper Format for Production:
A Source of Uncertainty in Litigation, RECENT DEVS. (Electronic Evidence Discovery, Inc.),
Aug. 1998, at 1, 5 [hereinafter Electronic vs. Paper] (discussing problems surrounding mix of
legal and complex technological questions involved in electronic data discovery disputes that
stem from judges' lack of technical knowledge); Robins, supra note 71, at 510 (explaining that
"[u]ntil litigators and judges gain greater familiarity with these issues, disputes over computer-
related discovery are likely to yield more fact-specific discretionary rulings that offer minimal
guidance to the bar").
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involving discovery of electronically stored data evidences a lack of knowl-
edge regarding current computer technology."' It is becoming increasingly
obvious that a significant part of the judiciary does not realize the extent to
which individuals and businesses are using computers. 67 A second reason for
the inequitable decisions regarding the allocation of discovery costs of elec-
tronically stored data is the insufficiency of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in addressing the issue."6 ' Critics maintain that the rules are too broad
and require substantial amendment to address more directly the changes in
technology and their impact on litigation." Regardless of the exact sources
of the problem, it is evident that something must be done to remedy the
situation because the courts seem to be unable to provide sound solutions
under the present rules.17°
In order to remedy the current situation, one must thoroughly analyze the
foregoing decisions to identify their flaws and weaknesses. In looking at these
cases, one must examine the various factors that the courts considered and the
manner in which the courts applied those factors when presented with motions
to shift the burden of cost of discovery of electronically stored data under
166. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 997,
1995 WL 360526, at *2-*3 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995) (providing reasoning behind decision to
deny request to shift burden of cost of discovery of electronically stored data to requesting
party). The court unreasonably referred to electronic storage of data as a choice. Id. Thus, it
failed to recognize the extent to which such practices have become commonplace in today's
business world. But see Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.D.R. 459,462 (D. Utah 1985) (recog-
nizing fact that computers have become commonplace in every aspect of society today). The
court in Bills acknowledged that "[firom the largest corporations to the smallest families, people
are using computers to cut costs, improve production, enhance communication, store countless
data and improve capabilities in every aspect of human and technological development." Id.
167. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 1995 WL 360526, at *2-*3 (referring to
electronic storage of data as choice). By referring to the use of electronic data storage as a
choice, the court failed to acknowledge the fact that most businesses and individuals today
utilize some method of computer storage. Thus, the court failed to take into consideration the
state of today's technology.
168. See Rosenberg, supra note I (discussing view of one judge in favor of revising Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure in order to thwart such broad discovery). Rosenberg quoted Judge
Paul Niemeyer of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit: "I sense that
discovery is being used as a tool of oppression, rather than as a tool of fairness." Id. Rosenberg
explained that Judge Niemeyer is "engaged in a national effort to re-examine the Federal rules
that allow such broad discovery." Id; see Robins, supra note 71, at 473 (stating that "[i]n the
area of cost-allocation, however, the guidance provided by the Rules is far less certain").
Robins is also of the opinion that "the framework of [the] Rules ... does not fit aptly to the
discovery of computer-related evidence." Id. at 477.
169. See Rosenberg, supra note 1 (explaining that Judge Niemeyer assists in national
movement to re-examine federal discovery rules).
170. See Robins, supra note 71, at 483 (explaining that unless things change, "courts will
probably continue to balance... factors.., in an ad hoc fashion, while avoiding the question
of whether a fundamental recalibration is needed").
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Rules 34 and 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, it
is important to explore the reasoning that the courts have set forth in reaching
their conclusions as well as the attitudes that the courts have presented in the
foregoing opinions.
The first case that the previous subpart discussed, Bills v. Kennecott
Corp.,"' is significant not because ofthe amount ofmoney involved in produc-
ing the requested computer data,'72 but rather because of the factors that the
court set forth in its burden-shifting determination.'73 When examining the
factors that the court considered in Bills, it is important first to note that the
court in In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs adopted and relied upon the
factors that the district court promulgated inBills.'74 Although it is not unusual
for one court to follow the opinion or analysis set forth in a decision of one of
its fellow courts, in this instance it is significant because the district court in
Bills specifically stated that in providing certain factors to consider in deter-
mining a definition of "undue" under Rules 34 and 26(c), it was not attempting
to promulgate "an ironclad formula'" for courts to use in other cases. 76 The
Bills court further opined that such a formula would be "judicially impru-
dent""' and entirely impractical because of the diverse nature of the various
cases and situations that confront the judiciary.7 ' However, by applying
identical factors in an entirely different case involving unique parties, claims,
and discovery requests, the court in In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs
virtuallyturnedthe Bills factors into an established formula formaking burden-
shifting determinations under Rules 34 and 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Furthermore, the court's action is significant because much ofthe
legal community currently considers In re BrandName Prescription Drugs to
171. See supra Part ILA.1 and accompanying text (providing detailed discussion and
analysis of Bills v. Kennecott Corp.).
172. See Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 460 (D. Utah 1985) (involving
discovery request for electronically stored data that cost defendant $5,411.25).
173. See id. at 464 (outlining factors court considered in determining whether discovery
request at issue amounted to undue burden or expense under Rule 26(c) of Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure); see also supra note 97 (providing detailed summary of Bills).
174. Compare In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, MDL
997, 1995 WL 360526, at *2 (N.D. II1. June 15, 1995) (listing factors for court to consider in
burden shifting decision) with Bills, 108 F.R.D. at 464 (outlining factors court considered in
determining whether to shift burden of cost of electronically stored data to requesting party).
175. Bills, 108 F.R.D. at 463.
176. See id. ("This Court does not attempt to set forth an ironclad formula into which the
facts of this or another case can be placed for determination of what 'undue' means under Rule
34.').
177. Id.
178. See id. ("Such a formula would be judicially imprudent and wholly impractical in
view of the diverse nature of the claims, discovery requests and parties before the Courts in a
variety of cases and situations.").
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be the "golden rule" regarding how courts should evaluate Rule 26(c) motions
to shift the burden of cost of electronically stored data discovery."79 Thus, in
In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, the District Court for the Northern
District of linois did exactly what the court in Bills was trying to prevent - it
inadvertently created an "ironclad formula" for these determinations. 8 °
The Bills opinion is also significant because the court articulated many
important concerns regarding the allocation of electronically stored data dis-
covery costs. 1 ' First, the court recognized that the ever-changing computer
age makes certain cost-shifting tactics less available to litigants than in the
past."a Specifically, the court explained that in the past, litigants were able
to shift the burden of costto the requesting party simply by making their paper
records available for inspection.'83 However, that choice is not available to
parties when electronically stored data is involved because it is usually far too
dangerous for a party to make its computer system available to an adver-
sary. 4 Thus, in the computer age, Rule 26(c) is a litigant's only source of
relief from an unduly burdensome or expensive discovery request. 5 Al-
though its observations are accurate, the court's ultimate decision seems to
disregard these observations by refusing to shift the burden of cost to the
requesting party.
1 s6
One can rationalize the conclusion in Bills by conceding that a cost of
approximately five thousand dollars" was not so expensive as to warrant
shifting the burden of cost to the requesting party. However, the amount in
controversy in In re BrandName Prescription Drugs was far greater than five
thousand dollars,s yet the court in that case also failed to shift the burden to
179. See Hagberg & Olson, supra note 20 (explaining that In re Brand Name Prescription
Drugs presents generally accepted method of dealing with burden-shifling determinations);
Lovell & Holmes, supra note 20, at 9 (same).
180. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text (discussing concerns of Bills court in
setting forth factors to consider in burden-shifting case).
181. See Bills v. Kennecott, Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459,462 (D. Utah 1985) (articulating con-
cerns regarding problems involved in allocating discovery costs of electronically stored data).
182. See id. (explaining that when information is stored in computers, it is less possible and
less necessary to make requesting party search records).
183. Id.
184. Id. Making a company's computer system available to an adversary runs the risk of
having the adverse party discover privileged information. Id. The court also explained that
opening up one's computer system to an adversary is impractical because of the various types
of computers in existence and the differences in experience and knowledge of many parties. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 464.
187. See id. (stating that printout cost $5,411.25).
188. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 997,
1995 WL 360526, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995) (explaining that cost of retrieving requested
e-mail would be approximately $50,000 to $70,000).
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the requesting party.'89 The court in In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs
articulated the factors set forth in Bills and claimed to apply these factors in
making its final determination, but a closer look at the opinion reveals that
certain outdated principles seem to have been the determinative forces behind
the court's conclusion."9
First, inln re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, the defendant relied upon
the Manual for Complex Litigation to support its argument that the court
should shift the burden of cost of discovery of the electronically stored data
to the requesting party.191 The relevant portion of the manual provides that if
the discovery request requires substantially expensive additional programming
for adequate compliance, the requesting party should bear the costs.19 The
manual even suggests that the parties make cost shifting a condition to produc-
tion. 9 The manual provides guidance, and the situation before the court clear-
ly fit within the scenario illustrated in the manual in that it required additional
programming at substantial expense. 94 However, the court found it more
appropriate to look to non-precedential case law as a basis for its decision,
although it did not provide a reason for this choice. 9 Instead, as previously
discussed, the court adopted the factors set forth in Bills as the basis for its
determination.196 After articulating these factors, the court seemingly failed
to apply them to the case at hand. 19 Instead, it simply concluded that even
though the discovery procedures at issue were expensive and the discovery
involved creating special computer programs for extracting the requested data,
189. See id. (concluding that current situation did not warrant shifting burden of cost of
discovery of electronically stored data to plaintiffs).
190. See infra notes 191-203 and accompanying text (discussing basis for court's decision
in In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs).
191. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 1995 WL 360526, at *2 (explaining that
defendant's position was based on argument that Manual for Complex Litigation contemplated
reimbursement in circumstances such as those in present case). Although the Manual for
Complex Litigation is not binding upon the courts, it stands as a well-respected source of
guidance in the legal community.




195. Id. at *2. The court relied on case law that provided that "the mere fact that the pro-
duction of computerized data will result in a substantial expense is not a sufficient justification
for imposing the costs of production on the requesting party." Id. However, the court failed to
provide a reason as to why it chose not to give the Manual for Complex Litigation any weight
in the current case and instead to rely on case law from a district court in Utah.
196. See id.; see also supra Part IIIA (summarizing and analyzing Bills v. Kennecolt
Corp.).
197. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 1995 WL 360526, at * 2 (articulating
court's reasoning for refusing to shift burden of cost to plaintiff).
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the requesting party should not bear these costs when the burden is a direct
result of the defendant's chosen record-keeping scheme."rs
In referring to the use of computer systems to store records as a choice,
the court demonstrated its lack of a true understanding of today's technologi-
cal world." In order to keep up with competitors and to maintain a success-
ful enterprise in the computer age, one has virtually no choice but to utilize
computers in business operations. Moreover, it is likely that even in 1995,
most individuals utilized computers in every facet of their lives, including
their personal lives.2"c This proposition is hardly new or unique. 01 Thus, the
In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs court was effectively punishing the
defendants simply for using technology consistent with normal practices of
the time.2 2 Although the court conceded that issues of "undue burden" are
complicated within the context of the retrieval and production of electroni-
cally stored data, the fact that these determinations are difficult does not
excuse the unreasonableness displayed in the court's opinion."3 The court's
reasoning simply illustrates the lack of familiarity and knowledge that much
of the judiciary has regarding computer related issues.
Finally, although the Supreme Court reversed Sanders v. Levy because
of the court of appeals's reliance on the wrong rules in the case,2 the appel-
198. Id.
199. Id. The court conceded that "[i]n the context of the retrieval and production of
computer-stored information issues of 'undue burden' become complicated." Id.
200. See Bills v. Kennecott, Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459,462 (D. Utah 1985) ("From the largest
corporations to the smallest families, people are using computers to cut costs, improve produc-
tion, enhance communication, store countless data and improve capabilities in every aspect of
human and technological development").
201. See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94CIV.2120 (LLM) (AJP), 1995 WL
649934, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3,1995) (quoting National Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1257, 1262-63 (E.D. Pa. 1980)); supra note 200 (quoting Bills court's
acknowledgment of impact that computers have on today's society). In 1980, the Matsushita
court predicted that by the year 2000 individuals and businesses would store virtually all data
electronically. Id. Thus, nearly 20 years ago, the judiciary was aware of the impending growth
in the use of computers in every facet of life. Yet, the court in In re Brand Name Prescription
Drugs failed to recognize the advent of the computer age and referred to the defendant's use of
an electronic storage method as a choice. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 1995 WL
360526, at * 2.
202. See Robins, supra note 71, at 483 (explaining that in order to make equitable cost-
allocation determinations, "courts must balance the need to preserve inexpensive access to
relevant information that has traditionally been available at little expense in conventional
discovery with the need to avoid penalizing the use of new technologies with whose evolution
the Rules have not kept pace" (emphasis added)).
203. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 1995 WL 360526, at *2 (illustrating
court's lack of knowledge of technological issues by referring to defendant's use of computer
storage as choice).
204. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 364 (1978) (reversing
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late court decision is still significant to this discussion because it illustrates
one court's misapplication of the discovery rules in the context of a burden-
shifting determination regarding electronically stored data. In reversing the
court of appeals's decision, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of
the lower court's application and analysis of the discovery rules; rather, the
Court simply determined that those rules were inappropriate in that case.2°5
Therefore, the lower court's application of, interpretation of, and ultimate
conclusion under the discovery rules are useful in that they provide another
poignant example of the judiciary's disparate treatment of requests to shift the
burden of discovery of electronically stored data. Furthermore, the opinion
illustrates the problems that the lack of specificity and guidance in the present
rules create in the complicated realm of computer-related discovery.
The Sanders opinion is illustrative of the reasoning and analysis of many
courts when dealing with these issues. The court's focus was misguided
because it relied almost solely on the impressive status and financial position
of the defendant to justify keeping the burden of cost on that party.206 This
type of analysis is far from sound because it only takes into consideration the
status and relative financial positions of the parties in determining proper
allocation of discovery costs, rather than considering other more neutral and
objective factors.2" It is hardly fair or equitable for courts to make burden-
shifting decisions based solely on the status and financial positions of the
parties because such purely subjective considerations will proliferate inconsis-
tencies among various court decisions. Thus, Sanders stands as a distressing
example of how easily the judiciary can abuse the sheer breadth of and lack
of guidance of the current discovery rules.
appellate court's decision that placed burden of culling names and addresses of class members
from electronic database on defendant rather than on plaintiff). The Supreme Court deter-
mined that the district court erred by applying the rules of discovery, rather than the rules gov-
erning class actions, in that case. Id. at 342. In addition, the Supreme Court determined that
it was an abuse of discretion not to require plaintiffs to bear the cost of discovery in this case.
Id.
205. Id. at 350.
206. See Sanders v. Levy, 558 F.2d 636, 650 (2d Cir. 1977) (en bane) (reasoning that
"[t]here is no injustice in requiring one whose business is vast and complex to go to proportion-
ately greater lengths to meet the law's legitimate requirements for disclosure of business-related
information than might be expected of one whose business is small and simple"), rev'd on other
grounds sub noma. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 342 (1978).
207. See id. (finding insufficient justification for refusing to shift burden of cost to request-
ing party). Although it is not wholly improper for a court to consider the parties' relative finan-
cial positions as one factor in its burden-shifting determination, it is insufficient for a court to
make such a factor its sole consideration. In this case, the court seemed to use the general rule
that the producing party pays as a crutch upon which to rest its inequitable reasoning. The court
seemed to use the general default rule in an attempt to justify its purely financial and status-
based reasoning.
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C. Cases in Which Courts Have PrescribedAlternative
Means of Production or Have Refused to Compel Respondents to Bear
the Costs of Discovery
As noted above, very few reported opinions consider the proper alloca-
tion of the costs of discovery of electronically stored data.2" The preceding
cases illustrate instances in which the courts have considered and ultimately
have refused to shift the burden of cost to the requesting party by exercising
their discretion under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
2°9
The following cases illustrate situations in which courts have suggested
alternative means of production in lieu of forcing the responding parties to
bear the'costs of producing the requested electronically stored data. 21  In
addition, some of these cases illustrate instances in which courts have denied
requesting parties discovery of certain electronically stored data. In looking
at these cases, it is important to observe the unusual circumstances under
which the courts either have prescribed alternative means of production or
have denied production of certain electronically stored data. 212 These opin-
ions represent the exception rather than the rule in cases involving discovery
of electronically stored data.
213
1. Cases in Which Courts Have Dealt with Alternative Means
ofProduction
a. Sattar v. Motorola, Inc.
In 1998, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
decided Sattar v. Motorola, Inc.,24 an employment discrimination action that
involved alleged religious discrimination by the plaintiff's supervisors.21 The
208. See supra Part IliA (explaining lack of vast amounts of case law pertaining to
allocation of discovery costs of electronically stored data).
209. See supra Part MLA-B (discussing and analyzing cases in which courts refused to shift
burden of cost to requesting party).
210. See infra Part 111.C.1 (setting out cases in which courts have suggested alternative
means of production).
211. See infra Part 11.2C- (explaining cases in which courts have denied discovery of
certain electronically stored data).
212. See infra Part 11C (discussing and analyzing cases in which courts have prescribed
alternative means of production or have denied discovery of electronically stored data).
213. Compare supra Part lIA-B (critiquing cases in which courts have refused to shift
burden of cost of electronically stored data to requesting party) with infra Part 11.C.1-2
(considering cases in which courts either have prescribed alternative means of production or
have denied requests for electronically stored data due to extreme circumstances).
214. 138 F.3d 1164 (7th Cir. 1998).
215. See Sattar v. Motorola, Inc., 138 F.3d 1164,1170-72 (7th Cir. 1998) (concluding that
former employee failed adequately to link discharge and religious harassment and that district
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plaintiff appealed the district court's ruling denying his discovery request for
hard copies of certain e-mail messages.216 In that action, Sattar requested
approximately 210,000 pages of e-mail in hard copy format, even though the
defendant had produced the data in the form of four-inch tapes. 11 The plain-
tiff requested the paper versions of the e-mail messages because he lacked the
equipment and software needed to read the tapes.
218
Instead of requiring the defendant to incur the substantial cost of printing
the already produced data in paper format, the district court prescribed alter-
native accommodations. 21 9 The court ordered the defendant either to down-
load the data from the tapes onto diskettes or a computer hard drive that the
plaintiff could use, to loan the plaintiff a copy of the software needed to read
court did not abuse its discretion in requiring defendant either to download electronic data to
disk or to loan plaintiff hard drive rather than requiring defendant to produce, at its own
expense, requested data). In Sattar, the plaintiff filed a religious discrimination suit against the
corporation for which he worked and his two supervisors, both in their corporate and individual
capacities. Id. at 1168. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant and
Sattar appealed. Id. at 1166. First, the appellate court found that the district court was correct
in dismissing Sattar's claims against his supervisors because supervisors do not, in their indi-
vidual capacities, fall within the statutory definition of employer. Id. at 1168. Second, the
appellate court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant
because Sattar failed adequately to link his discharge to his supervisor's religious harassment
Id. at 1170.
Sattar also appealed the district court ruling that denied his motion to compel the defen-
dant to produce data in hard copy format Id. at 1171. The defendant previously had produced
the data in electronic format on four-inch tapes; however, the plaintiff claimed the data was
inaccessible to him in this format because he did not have the necessary software to read the
tapes. Id. The district court determined that it was appropriate to require the defendant to either
download the data onto standard computer disks or onto a computer hard drive, to loan the
plaintiff the necessary software with which to read the tapes, or to offer the plaintiff access to
its own computer system. Id. Should all of the recommended alternative means of production
fail, the court ordered the parties to split the costs of copying the data. Id. The defendant ulti-
mately complied with the district court's order by providing the plaintiff with a hard drive that
contained the requested electronic data. Id. However, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant
had altered or modified the data contained on the hard drive. Id. He then asked the court to
compel discovery in hard copy format and to hold the defendant in contempt Id. The district
court inferred that the plaintiff was using this claim in an attempt to broaden the scope of his
discovery of electronically stored data. Id. at 1172. Accordingly, the district court rejected
Sattar's claim that the defendant altered the data, and the appellate court afllrmed the lower
court's order. Id. at 1171-72.
216. Id. at 1171. The plaintiff also appealed the district court's grant of summaryjudgment
to the defendant on the Title VII claim. Id. at 1166.
217. Id. at 1171.
218. Id. It is important to note that the four-inch tapes that the defendant produced were
a commonly used form of backup tape. See Electronic vs. Paper, supra note 165, at 1 (discuss-
ing and analyzing Sattar).
219. Sattar, 138 F.3d at 1171.
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the tapes, or to provide the plaintiff in-house access to its own computer
system.m° Furthermore, the district court determined that if the parties found
the previous options to be unsatisfactory then it would simply require each
party to bear half the costs of printing the requested data."m In reviewing this
ruling, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined
that the lower court did not abuse its discretion by prescribing alternative
means of production.'m
Sattar provides an example ofthe typical alternative means ofproduction
that courts offer parties in cases involving disputes over discovery of electron-
ically stored data.tm Although the Sattar court's recommendations seem
sound and reasonable, some of these alternatives are extremely risky for the
producing parties. For example, the court proposed that the defendant provide
the plaintiff with access to its computer system. 4 Such access is extremely
risky for the defendant because the plaintiff would then have "free reign" over
the defendant's files.' This poses the risk that the plaintiff will gain access
to sensitive or privileged data. 6 Thus, most defendants are not willing to
undertake such severe potential risks.'
Furthermore, although the court's decision provides the parties with
alternative methods of production from which to choose freely, the decision
implies that the defendant failed to satisfy the discovery request by producing
the data on a commonly used type of backup tape.' One commentator warned
that this type of decision could lead to needless increases in discovery costs.'m
Thus, Sattar is yet another example of some ofthe many problems thatthe lack




223. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text (discussing alternative means of
production in lieu of requiring producing party to bear electronic data discovery costs).
224. Sattar, 138 F.3d at 1171.
225. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text (addressing risks inherent in turning
over computer system to adversary in litigation).
226. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (mentioning risk of waiving attorney-client
privilege by providing adversary with access to their computer system).
227. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (asserting fact that most litigants are
vehemently against allowing adversary to have access to their computer network).
228. See Electronic vs. Paper, supra note 165, at 1 (summarizing Sattar decision, in which
court proscribed alternative methods of production in lieu of requiring defendant to produce
printouts at own expense).
229. See id. (explaining that "[t]he decision that defendant had not satisfied its discovery
obligations by producing data on a type of backup tape commonly used by businesses is
troublesome because it is not clearly explained and if misinterpreted it could lead to unwar-
ranted increases in costs of discovery").
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creates, as well as an example of the judiciary's lack of experience with and
teehical understanding of computer-related issues in litigation.? °
b. Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd.
Although most courts are unaware of the potential problems that provid-
ing for alternative means of discovery of electronically stored data can create,
some courts have acknowledged these potential problems; as a result, those
courts have refused to prescribe or to condone alternatives. 1 For example,
in Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 2 the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit affirmed a district court's ruling that denied the plaintiff
access to the defendant's hard drive."s In reaching this conclusion, the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit explained that the discovery would involve
substantial risks and costs and could permanently affect the defendant's
computer network.234  The court balanced the risks, burdens, and delays
involved in providing the plaintiff with access to the defendant's hard drive
against the importance of the evidence sought and the likelihood of finding the
evidence. 35 Ultimately, both the district and appellate courts concluded that
such an alternative was neither sound nor efficient in that case.2 6
It is important to note that the facts in Fennell are quite unusual because
the defendant already had produced the requested data on computer disks and
the plaintiff merely was seeking discovery of the defendant's hard drive in an
230. See id. at 2 (explaining that "[tihe courts are naturally reluctant to go beyond general
decisions until greater judicial experience and understanding has been accumulated. In the
meanwhile, these issues are going to continue to be a source of uncertainty in litigation.").
231. See infra notes 232-49 (discussing and analyzing cases in which courts have refused
to prescribe alternative means of discovery because of potential problems involved).
232. 83 F.3d 526 (1st Cir. 1996).
233. See Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526,533 (1st Cir. 1996) (concluding
that district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant plaintiff access to defendant's
hard drive). In Fennell, the plaintiff sued the defendant, her former employer, claiming that the
defendant discharged her because she reported a sexual harassment complaint Id. at 526.
During the course of litigation, the plaintiff requested further discovery of the defendant's hard
drive to determine whether the defendant fabricated the data in question. Id. at 531-32. The
district court denied the plaintiff further discovery because the risks and costs to the defendant
would be substantial and because the plaintiff could not substantiate her claim that a computer
expert could discover evidence of fabrication. Id. at 532-33. First, the appellate court found
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff further discovery. Id.
at 533-34. Second, the appellate court determined that the plaintiff failed to present a genuine
issue of material fact regarding whether her former employer's proffered reason for her dis-
charge was actually a pretext for retaliation. Id. at 537. Accordingly, the appellate court
affirmed the district court's judgment. Id.
234. Id. at 533 n.8.
235. Id. at 532.
236. Id. at 533.
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attempt to prove that the defendant had fabricated certain data. 7 Thus, it is
unclear whether the court would have denied the request for discovery of the
defendant's hard drive if the defendant had not already produced the requested
data in a reasonably usable electronic form. It seems likely that the court
would not have denied the plaintiff's request absent such unusual circum-
stances.
c. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, 8 the plaintiff requested access to
the defendant's personal computer hard drive in order to attempt to recover
deleted files, to review certain e-mail messages, and to produce 'relevant
documents." 9 The plaintiff explained that it needed access to the defendant's
hard drive because the defendant's practice of deleting e-mail messages made
it impossible to produce the information in paper form.240 In addressing the
plaintiff's request, the court determined that it was likely that the defendant's
hard drive contained the relevant information. 241 However, the court explained
237. Id.
238. 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
239. See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1054 (S.D. Cal. 1999)
(allowing plaintiff to create mirror image of defendant's hard drive in order to review and
produce relevant documents). In Playboy, the plaintiff sought access to the defendant's hard
drive in order to recover electronic versions of e-mail messages that the defendant previously
had deleted and that were no longer available in paper form. Id. at 1051. The court allowed the
plaintiff to discover the requested information, but it sought to protect the defendant against
undue burden and expense and against an invasion of privileged information. Id. at 1053.
Thus, the court ordered that the parties follow a specific protocol with respect to the discovery
of the defendant's hard drive. Id. at 1054-55. The court-ordered protocol required the plaintiff
to submit statements from computer experts regarding the ability to recover the deleted e-mail
messages, the likelihood of recovering some of those messages, and the amount of damage, if
any, that would result to the defendant's computer from this recovery process. Id. at 1054-55.
The protocol required the court to appoint a computer expert to create a "mirror image" of the
defendant's hard drive and to serve as an officer of the court. Id. at 1055. The parties had to
agree on a date and time to access the defendant's computer, and the defendant and her attorney
could be present during the recovery of the defendant's hard drive. Id. Once the computer
expert created the mirror image of the defendant's hard drive, that mirror image would be given
to the defendant's attorney, who would "print and review any recovered documents and produce
to Plaintiff those communications that are responsive to any earlier request for documents and
relevant to the subject matter of this litigation." Id. Finally, the court ordered that any docu-
ments that the defendant's attorney found to be privileged would be recorded in a privilege log.
Id. In addition to the discovery of the defendant's hard drive, the plaintiff sought discovery of
the defendant's federal and state income tax returns. Id. The appellate court ordered the
defendant to produce her 1997 corporate tax return and to submit her tax returns for three other
years to the court for an in camera review. Id. at 1056.
240. Id. at 1053.
241. Id.
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that in cases involving the discovery of electronically stored data, the produc-
ing party must be "protected against undue burden and expense and/or invasion
of privileged matter."242 The court allowed the plaintiff to gain access to the
defendant's hard drive, but it outlined specific protocol with regard to the
discovery of the defendant's hard drive in order to ensure protection against
an invasion of privileged matter.243
The court in Playboy recognized the risks inherent in allowing an adver-
sary to gain access to one's hard drive.244 However, instead of merely voicing
its concern for the defendant's protection against undue burden, expense, and
invasion of privileged matter, the court took action to protect the defendant
against these risks by creating a detailed protocol for the parties to follow.
245
Specifically, the court appointed a neutral computer expert to create a "mirror
image" ofthe defendant's hard drive.246 The court went even further by requir-
ing that computer expert to serve as an officer of the court.247 In addition, the
court allowed the defendant's counsel to review the recovered documents and
to produce only those documents that were responsive and relevant, and it
allowed the defendant's attorney to be the sole custodian of the mirror image
of the defendant's hard drive.248 Through these procedures, the court ensured
the protection of the defendant's privacy and privilege interests while still
allowing the plaintiff to discover the information sought.249 Thus, Playboy is
significant because it represents a step in the right direction on the part of the
judiciary.
2. Cases in Which Courts Have Refused to Place the Burden of
Cost on the Producing Parties
In some instances, courts have denied requests for electronically stored
data after finding that those requests were unduly burdensome or expensive."
These decisions represent a step in the right direction on the part of the judi-
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1054-55. The court stated that "the [d]efendant's privacy and attorney-client
privilege will be protected pursuant to the protocol outlined below, and [d]efendant's counsel
will have an opportunity to control and review all of the recovered e-mails, and produce to
[p]laintiff only those documents that are relevant, responsive, and non-privileged." Id. at 1054.
244. See id. (addressing risk that requesting party might gain access to privileged matter
on defendant's hard drive).
245. Id.; supra note 239 (describing in detail court-ordered discovery protocol).
246. Id. at 1055.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1054-55.
250. See infra Part DI.C.2-3 (discussing and analyzing cases in which courts have denied
requests for electronically stored data due to undue burden or expense).
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ciary because they provide defendants with some protection against abusive
discovery requests. However, as the following cases illustrate, the circum-
stances under which courts make these decisions are unusual and extreme."'
It is evident that courts are still quite hesitant to shift the burden of cost from
the producing party orto deny discovery ofthe requested materials altogether.
a. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc.
In Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 2 the plaintiff presented the
District Court for the Southern District of New York with a request for discov-
ery of certain electronically stored data.'5 Specifically, the defendants already
had produced the requested data in printout form, and the plaintiff requested
the same data in electronic form as well.m4 Although case law permits the
discovery of data in computerized form even when the respondent already has
produced that data in hard copy format,255 the district court determined that the
case required further negotiation between the parties. 6 The defendants
251. See infra Part III.C.2-3 (considering cases involving extreme circumstances under
which courts have denied discovery of electronically stored data).
252. 94CIV.2120 (LLM) (AJP), 1995 WL 649934, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3,1995).
253. See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 94CIV.2120 (LLM) (AJP), 1995 WL
649934, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3,1995). InAnti-Monopoly, the plaintiffpresented the court with
a discovery request for specific electronically stored data. Id. The defendants objected to the
request because they claimed that they already had produced the requested data in paper form.
Id. at *2. The court rejected this objection by relying on the rule that production of information
in "hard copy" form does not preclude a party from requesting and receiving that data in
electronic format Id. The defendants next argued that complying with the discovery request
at issue would be unduly burdensome and expensive because the defendants would have to
create new documents because the information no longer existed in electronic format Id. at *2-
*3. The court observed that if the requested data actually did not exist in electronic form, then
the issue would be moot Id. at *3. The court determined that the defendants would have to
prove both that the data was no longer available electronically and that it was impossible to
recreate electronically the data by using specially tailored computer programs over existing
electronic data. Id. at *3 n.1. Furthermore, the court determined that it did not possess adequate
information regarding the plaintiff's need for the electronic versions of the data or the true costs
that the defendants faced in creating a special program to rewrite or to "retrieve" the data. Id.
at *3. Ultimately, the court ordered the parties to attempt to resolve the issue on their own. Id.
The court further stated that if the parties were unable to come to an agreement, they were to
submit appropriate affidavits from computer experts to the court so that it could make a proper
decision. Id.
254. Id. at*1.
255. See id. at *2 ("[T]he rule is cleaw production of information in 'hard copy' documen-
tary form does not preclude a party from receiving that same information in computer-
ized/electronic form."); see also supra note 34 and accompanying text (explaining that parties
can discover data in computerized form, even if producing party already has produced paper
versions of same data).
256. Anti-Monopoly, Inc., 1995 WL 649934, at *1.
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argued that the situation was unique because the requested computer data no
longer existed in electronic format. 57 Thus, the defendants would have to
recreate the data in electronic format and incur substantial expense and delay
in the process. 5 The court declared that it would need additional information
in order to rule on the issue, but it stated that if the reports actually no longer
existed in electronic format, the issue would be moot."' However, the court
explained that in order to prove the issue moot, the defendants would have to
show that it was impossible to recreate electronically the requested data
through the use of special computer programs.2'e In discussing the additional
information needed, the court stated that it would take into account factors
such as the plaintiff's actual need for the electronic versions ofthe documents
and the "real costs"' to the defendants in both time and money.
2 62 Further-
more, the court explained that its ruling might depend on the plaintiff's will-
ingness to bear the costs of creating the program needed to "recreate" the
data. Ultimately, the court required the parties to submit affidavits from
computer experts regarding the plaintiff's need for electronic versions of the
invoices and the defendants' ability to recreate or restore the no longer existing
electronic versions of the invoices.2 4
b. Torrington Co. v. United States
In Torrington Co. v. United States, 265 the Court of International Trade
considered a plaintiff's request for production of certain computer tapes con-
taining the defendant's computer programming code and other data.2' As in
257. Id. at *2.
258. Id. at*3. The defendant claimed that "[t]he burden to Hasbro of collecting all of these
electronic [documents] is substantial and certain: weeks of programming and computer time
to collect the [documents] followed by substantial attorney review time to ensure that they are
responsive. It would be impossible to complete production by the [c]ourt's ... deadline." Id.
259. Id.





265. 786 F. Supp. 1027 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1992).
266. See Torrington Co. v. United States, 786 F. Supp. 1027,1028 (Ct Int'l Trade 1992)
(discussing plaintiff's request for production of computer tape containing defendant's computer
programming instructions and other data). In Torrington, the plaintiff requested production of
certain data contained on computer tapes. Id. at 1028. The United States Court of International
Trade first found that although the plaintiff claimed entitlement to the information as part of the
administrative record of the case, the information actually was not in the administrative record.
Id. Moreover, the court determined that the plaintiff failed to articulate adequately the need for
the requested computer tapes. Id. at 1029. In addition, the court indicated that the defendant
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Anti-Monopoly, the defendant already had produced the documents in hard
copy format, but the plaintiff requested the electronic versions of the docu-
ments as well.26 The requested computer data no longer existed in electronic
format, and either the plaintiff or the defendant would have had to recreate the
data at a great burden and expense.s After balancing the need of the plaintiff
against the hardship to the defendant, the court denied the plaintiff's motion
to compel production of the requested electronic data.269
3. Discussion andAnalysis of the Preceding Cases
The two decisions discussed above demonstrate that the courts are begin-
ning to acknowledge the differences inherent in discovery requests for elec-
tronically stored data as opposed to those for mere paper documents. 2 In
those cases, the courts implied thatthey would grant the electronic data discov-
ery request at issue only if the requesting parties were willing to bear the costs
associated with producing that electronic dataY' However, those decisions are
unique because of the unusual circumstances surrounding the opinions." 2
For example, in both cases above, because the requested data ceased to
exist in electronic format, the courts seemed willing to relieve the defendants
of the burden of recreating the data under those circumstancesY 3 It is un-
sufficiently demonstrated that complying with the discovery request in question would result
in extreme hardship. Id. The court explained that in the present case, the data requested did not
exist in electronic format. Id. at 1030. Thus, the defendant "would be required to create the
computer tapes at great burden and expense." Id. The court explained that access to the com-
puter tapes was not essential because the plaintiff would receive microfilmed computer printouts
of the information. Id. at 1029. Furthermore, the burden, cost, and time to recreate the tapes
would be equal for both parties. Id. at 1030. The court reasoned that the burden of production
should fall on the requesting party because to place such burden on the defendant would be
wholly unfair. Id. Accordingly, the court denied the plaintiff's discovery request. Id. at 1031.
267. Id. at 1029.
268. Id. at 1030.
269. Id. at 1030-31. The court determined that in the present action, recreating the
requested computer data would take the defendant substantial time and would cost the defendant
an enormous amount ofmoney. Id. at 1030. The court reasoned that because the burden would
be equal on both parties, that is, it would cost the same and take the same amount of time for
the plaintiff to recreate the data as the defendant, the requesting party should bear the burden
of producing the information. Id.
270. See supra Part IILC.2 (discussing situations in which courts have acknowledged
differences inherent in paper documents versus electronic documents and therefore have denied
discovery requests).
271. See .supra Part IILC.2 (discussingAnti-Monopol, Inc. and Torrington Co. decisions).
272. See supra Part ]ILC.2 (involving situations in which requested data no longer existed
in electronic format).
273. See supra Part flI.C.2 (discussing cases in which requested data no longer existed in
electronic format).
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likely that the courts would have shifted the burden of cost to the plaintiffs if
the data were still electronically available, even if the production entailed
designing special computer programs to extract the requested files.274 The
courts seem reluctant to prescribe this sort of remedy absent extremely un-
usual circumstances. Thus, in most instances, it is arguable that courts will
remain unwilling to shift the burden of retrieving electronically stored data to
the requesting party, even if the discovery entails extensive technical work
and involves exorbitant expenses on the producing party's part. This realiza-
tion demonstrates that the problems surrounding the allocation of discovery
costs of electronically stored data will continue until something is done to
remedy these inequities.
IV Recommendations
Currently, conflicting schools of thought exist regarding the allocation
of the costs of discovery of electronically stored data. One scholar and one
judge have opined that the discovery rules should remain as they are and that
courts should continue to construe them as broadly as possible." In addition
to favoring a broad construction, they support the strict application of the
general rule that the burden of discovery costs of electronically stored data
falls upon the producing party. " However, the preceding discussions show
that such a strict approach has created serious problems in litigation and has
opened the door to new means of discovery abuse by litigants.2" Further-
more, it is evident that the judiciary lacks sufficient technical knowledge and
a true understanding of the complex issues involved in electronic data discov-
ery with which to make fair and equitable determinations under the currently
broad discovery rules.27
Other scholars and judges have opined that the current discovery rules
need to be reshaped in order to address more adequately the technical com-
274. Cf In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 997,
1995 WL 360526, at *1, *3 (N.D. Il. June 15,1995) (denying request to shift burden of discov-
cry that cost $50,000 to $70,000); Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459,460,464 (D. Utah
1985) (refusing to shift $5411.25 burden of discovery to requesting party); supra Part IILA-B
(discussing cases in which courts refused to shift discovery costs).
275. See Rosenberg, supra note I (explaining that some judges are in favor of extremely
broad interpretations of discovery rules). Rosenberg quoted Judge Jack B. Weinstein: "I'm in
favor of full revelation .... I'm in favor of the Brandeis doctrine - let the sun shine in." Id.
276. See id. (mentioning view of some members of legal community that judiciary should
construe discovery rules broadly to allow for extensive discovery, regardless of costs that
producing parties incur).
277. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text (discussing ways in which plaintiffs
use electronic data discovery requests to force defendants into settlement).
278. See supra notes 83, 165-67, 199-203 and accompanying text (decrying judiciary's
level of ignorance of computer-related issues).
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plexities of our societyY9 They believe that the lack of guidance contained
in the current discovery rules has contributed to the inequities present in many
of the decisions regarding discovery of electronically stored data." These
views seem to represent the best way in which to cure the defects inherent in
the current rules of civil procedure.
A. Provide Courts with Specific Guidelines to
Consider by Amending the Advisory Committee Notes to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
The best way to remedy the current problems concerning allocating the
discovery costs of electronically stored data involves providing courts with
specific guidelines to consider when presented with electronic data cost-
allocation decisions. These guidelines would address the issues and risks
inherent in the nature of electronic data discovery."1 As discussed above, the
court in Bills v. Kennecott considered four factors in its burden-shifling deci-
sion.' Although it is improper for courts to rely solely on those factors in
making similar decisions," it is not improper in some cases for courts to
consider those factors in conjunction with other important factors. Therefore,
the proposed guidelines should incorporate the Bills factors along with other
pertinent factors. 4 In order to keep the discovery costs proportionate to the
279. See Rosenberg, supra note 1 (explaining that some judges and practitioners believe
that discovery rules should be amended to better address volume of electronic data in litigation).
Rosenberg quoted Judge Paul Neimeyer of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit: "I sense that discovery is being used as a tool of oppression, rather than as a tool of
fairness. I think we should be asking whether this is the way Solomon would have done it,
given this complex society." Id. Rosenberg also quoted Jim Archibald, division director of the
American Bar Association's litigation section: "Maybe this vast technology will be the catalyst
to reshape the rules of discovery, which have been so broad up until this point. People have
been claiming this discovery process has been getting out of hand." Id.
280. See id. (quoting judge and commentator who support notion that lack of guidance in
discovery rules contributes to problems surrounding allocation of electronic data discovery
costs); Robins, supra note 71, at 473 (stating that guidance discovery rules provide with regard
to cost-allocation issues is uncertain).
281. See Robins, supra note 71, at 483 (suggesting that "courts must balance the need to
preserve inexpensive access to relevant information that has traditionally been available at little
expense in conventional discovery with the need to avoid penalizing the use of new technolo-
gies with whose evolution the Rules have not kept pace").
282. See supra Part lI.A.1 (discussing Bills v. Kennecott Corp.).
283. See Robins, supra note 71, at 483 (hypothesizing that "courts will probably continue
to balance the factors.., in an ad hoc fashion, while avoiding the question of whether a
fundamental recalibration is needed"); in'fra note 290 (explaining that reliance on formulaic
factors creates problems in electronic data discovery cases).
284. See Bills v. Kennecot, Corp., 108 FRD. 459,464 (D. Utah 1985) (setting forth four
factors that court considered in making burden shifting determination). The court in Bills
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size and scope of the lawsuit, other factors should include, but are by no
means limited to, a consideration of the amount of data requested and the
related costs of retrieval of that data in relation to the magnitude of the law-
suit." In addition, the guidelines should include a consideration ofthe actual
relevancy of the requested electronic data, in order for the court to determine
whether the request is valid or merely oppressive or abusive. The guidelines
should contain a consideration of the requesting party's actual need for the
electronic versions of the requested data in order to determine whether it is
possible for that party to achieve its objectives by using the less-expensive
paper versions of the documents. The guidelines also should suggest that
courts consider the possible benefits of the data to both parties and the ease
or difficulty in actually producing the data in order to determine whether the
situation warrants a "King Solomon" 6 type of cost-allocation scheme. These
proposed guidelines will provide greater balance in the electronic data discov-
ery decisions because they aim at shifling the courts' focus from the individ-
ual status and financial positions of the parties to more objective and case-
neutral considerations. However, the suggested guidelines do not represent
an exhaustive list of factors for the courts to consider. Rather, the guidelines
should continue to grow and change as technology does. Furthermore, the
judiciary should not hesitate to utilize these guidelines because the current
problems will only continue to worsen absent expedient changes.
The most effective way in which to implement these guidelines would be
to incorporate them into the current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Al-
though it may not be necessary to rewrite the current rules, it would be ex-
tremely helpful for the Advisory Committee to amend its notes to include
these guidelines, which specifically address the issues surrounding discovery
of electronically stored data.' In recommending that the Advisory Commit-
tee incorporate these guidelines into its notes to the current Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, it is important to recognize that the guidelines would serve
merely as structural "guideposts"; they would not attempt to promulgate a
formulaic burden-shifting rule. Instead, these guidelines would provide judges
with a better understanding of the issues involved and the concerns and risks
considered: (1) the expense and burden to the responding party as compared to the relative
expense and burden on the requesting party, (2) whether the amount of money involved was
excessive or inordinate, (3) whether the amount of money in question would be a substantial
burden to the requesting party, and (4) whether the responding party would benefit to some
degree from producing the data. Id.
285. See Rosenberg, supra note 1 (reporting judge's suggestion that costs of litigation be
appropriate to size of case).
286. See supra note 279 (quoting Judge Paul Niemeyer of United States Court ofAppeals
for Fourth Circuit).
287. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (recognizing that Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure fail to give courts sufficient guidance as to how to determine properly whether situ-
ations warrant burden shifting).
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ofthe litigants. Furthermore, the guidelines would give judges an overview of
the technical aspects of electronically stored data discovery - knowledge that
many judges currently lack."5 These proposed guidelines would serve as
helpful factors for courts to examine when determining whether a request for
electronically stored data is legitimate and warrants the producing party's
bearing the burden of cost or whether the request is merely abusive, oppressive,
or excessive, such that it warrants shifting the burden of cost to the requesting
party or prescribing alternative cost-allocation measures.
In suggesting that the Advisory Committee implement electronically
stored data guidelines into its notes to the discovery rules, it is important to
address the concerns that the court in Bills v. Kennecott voiced. 9 That court
recognized the risks posed by implementing a formula by which courts are to
consider allocating the costs of discovery of electronically stored data.' An
established formula would thwart the purpose of amendment because it would
merely codify what the courts have been doing wrong in these situations.
Rather, it is more appropriate for the Advisory Committee to set forth the
aforementioned guidelines in its notes for courts to take into consideration
when faced with motions to shift the burden of cost to the requesting party
under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Again, these guide-
lines would not be strictly binding; instead, they merely would stand as helpful
"guideposts" aimed at keeping the courts in line with one another and on the
path toward just and equitable decision-making. In addition, the guidelines
would be flexible enough to withstand the constant changes in technology.
The courts have admitted openly that they lack the sufficient guidance and
understanding of the issues surrounding the allocation of discovery costs of
electronically stored data with which to make sound decisions."1 For example,
the cases previously discussed illustrate that courts often focus only on the
status and relative financial positions ofthe parties rather than on factors that
are more objective and case-neutral. 9  These decisions are often unjust or
inequitable, and they usually failto provide a sound basis for consistency in the
288. See Robins, supra note 71, at 510 ("Until... judges gain greater familiarity with these
issues, disputes over computer-related discovery are likely to yield more fact-specific discretion-
ary rulings that offer minimal guidance to the bar.").
289. See Bills, 108 F.,.D. at 463 (warning that in setting forth factors to consider in case
at hand, court was not attempting to set forth "an ironclad formula" for determining whether
discovery request for electronically stored data was undue burden upon responding party).
290. See id. (explaining that "[sjuch a formula would be judicially imprudent and wholly
impractical in view of the diverse nature of the claims, discovery requests and parties before the
[c]ourts in a variety of cases and situations").
291. See id. at 462 ("The Advisory Committee statement, however, gives the [c]ourt no
guidance as to how properly to determine whether the burden or expense is 'undue' where
discovery of computer stored information is involved.").
292. See supra Part ILA-B (discussing and analyzing pertinent opinions in which courts
considered shifting burden of cost of discovery of electronically stored data to requesting party).
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future. The suggested guidelines would help solve these problems by provid-
ing the judiciary with sufficient direction while still allowing for case-by-case
decision-making. In addition, they would militate against courts relying on
irrelevant or inconsequential factors in the decision-making process. Further-
more, ifjudges are better educated regarding the technological issues involved
in electronic data discovery, they will be more able to decide the appropriate
guidelines to weigh in each unique case. Ideally, the courts only will consider
those factors that are of consequence to the case before them, rather than
relying on factors that may not be of importance under that particular set of
circumstances. Most importantly, these guidelines would prevent courts from
relying upon the "general rule" simply because they lack the guidance or the
knowledge with which to prescribe an alternative cost-allocation scheme.
Finally, although it is clear that including guidelines within the Advisory
Committee Notes ofthe relevant discovery rules will create greater equity and
consistency among the various court rulings without destroying the judicial
discretion inherent inthe current rules, courts should not wait until the ultimate
amendment in order to acknowledge these guidelines. Rather, courts should
begin to implement and to utilize the aforementioned guidelines as soon as
possible so that the current inequities surrounding the allocation of discovery
costs of electronically stored data will cease. The best way for the legal
community to ensure that courts properly implement the suggested guidelines
is to encourage the judiciary to become better educated regarding the technical
issues surrounding electronic data discovery.
B. Educate the Judiciary on the Technological Issues Affecting
the Litigation Process
Some members of the judiciary have recognized their lack of adequate
technical knowledge and understanding of the issues surrounding cost-alloca-
tion of electronic data discovery needed to make just and equitable deci-
sions.'s The questionable reasoning that the courts set forth in their opinions
and the inconsistencies that exist from court to court evidence this lack of
knowledge.2 4 Therefore, another step toward improving the current applica-
tion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in electronic data discovery cases
293. See Sanders v. Levy, 558 F. Supp. 636, 649 (2d Cir. 1977) (en bane) (discussing
problems that stem from courts' lack of knowledge and experience with computer technology),
rev'd on other grounds sub noma. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978).
The court admitted that "computer technology presents discovery problems with which the
courts have developed relatively little familiarity." Id.
294. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 997,
1995 WL 360526, at *2 (N.D. MI1. June 15, 1995) (referring to defendant's computer storage
method as choice). In this case, the court penalized the defendant for choosing such a method,
thereby illustrating the court's lack of technical knowledge concerning computer-related issues.
Id.
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involves thoroughly educating the members of the judiciary regarding the
issues inherent in these cases." Increasing the technical knowledge of the
judges would provide them with a greater understanding of the aggregate
issues, and it would enable judges to make better decisions regarding the
allocation of electronic data discovery costs. The legal community could
accomplish these goals by establishing a system through which judges receive
information regarding new developments in computer technology and their
impact upon electronic data discovery. There are several companies that
specialize in dealing with these issues."6 These "expert' companies could
work in conjunction with members of the legal community to provide some-
thing as simple as periodic seminars or a newsletter service to the judges.
Such a service undoubtedly would increase the quality and consistency of the
opinions concerning electronic data discovery.
Finally, judges more readily should consult computer experts when
specific, technical electronically stored data issues arise.' Utilizing experts
will lead to better decision-making and also will ensure that the judges rely on
the most accurate and current information regarding computer-related discov-
ery. Furthermore, implementation of these suggestions certainly will curtail
the problems currently occurring because the better informed and educated the
judges are, the harder it will be for litigants to succeed in using the discovery
rules as tools of oppression against their adversaries. Recently, at least one
court employed the services of a computer expert when confronted with a
complicated electronic data discovery issue.'a That court utilized the com-
puter expert's services in conjunction with a detailed discovery protocol in
order to protect the defendant in that case against undue expense and burden
and, more importantly, against an invasion of its privileged information.'
Such practices are a step in the right direction on the part of the judiciary.
295. See Robins, supra note 71, at 510 (opining that until "judges gain greater familiarity"
with electronic data discovery issues, disputes regarding those issues are "likely to yield more
fact-specific discretionary rulings that offer minimal guidance to the bar").
296. Electronic Evidence Discovery, Inc. and Computer Forensics, Inc. are two of the
country's leading companies that specialize in the discovery of electronically stored data. Firms
such as these could work in conjunction with members of the bar and members ofthe judiciary
to create a program designed to bring the legal community up to speed with current computer
technology and its impact on litigation.
297. See MANUALFORCOMPLEXLIrTGATION (SECOND) § 21.446, at 60 n.78 (1985) (sup-
plementtoCHARLEsALANWRIGHr&ARTHURMMuimFDmBALPRACHcEANDPRocemuRE
(1964-1994)) (suggesting that if "the judge is not sufficiently familiar with the technology, the
matter may be referred to a special master or to a court-appointed expert").
298. See supra Part ]I.C.l.c (discussing facts of Playboy case).
299. See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1054-55 (S.D. Cal.
1999) (stating that "[d]efendant's privacy and attorney-client privilege will be protected
pursuant to the protocol outlined below" that included appointment of computer expert to serve
as officer of court throughout discovery process).
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C. Encourage Litigants to Address Electronic Data Discovery
Issues Early in Litigation
Another way in which to remedy the current problems regarding allocat-
ing costs of electronically stored data is to encourage litigants to address these
issues at the earliest stages of litigation."a°  All too often, litigants are un-
aware of the scope of discoverability of electronically stored data. 01 Many
parties are unaware of specifically how much electronic data they have stored
and exactly what those files or backup tapes include.3" If the judiciary and
the legal community encourage partiesto address the electronic data discovery
issues early on, those litigants will be better prepared for any electronic data
discovery requests. Litigants then will have an opportunity to get their files
in order, to discern what procedures they may need to comply with potential
requests for electronically stored data, and to estimate the likely costs of pro-
ducing the requested computer data.
In addition to making parties better informed and better prepared, encour-
aging parties to address electronic data discovery issues early inthe process of
litigation will give those parties the opportunity to negotiate possible discovery
agreements. For example, if the parties to a suit are made aware of the possi-
ble requests for electronically stored data, each party can obtain an estimate of
the costs, in both time and money, of complying with such requests. In some
cases in which parties have done this, they have agreed to split the discovery
costs of electronically stored data if the information sought would benefit both
parties. 3 In other cases, the parties have each agreed to be responsible for
their own electronic data discovery costs when the discovery requests have
been substantially similar in size and expense.3 ' Yet in other cases, the parties
have agreed to set the boundaries of electronic data discovery by narrowing
requests for this type of data in an effort to minimize costs,3 °5
300, See Susan 3. Silvernail, Electronic Evidence: Discovery in the ComputerAge, ALA.
LAW., May 1997, at 177 (1997) (supporting litigants making inquiries into existence of comput-
erized data and processes for its retrieval at outset of litigation).
301. See Marellino & Bongiomo, supra note 12 (discussing litigation hazards related to
common user misperceptions).
302. See Rosenberg, supra note 1 (explaining problem that most parties retain vast amounts
of data on hard drives and backup tapes).
303. See Hagberg & Olson, supra note 20 (discussing pending cases in which parties have
worked together to come to agreements regarding discovery of electronically stored data).
304. See id. ("In a number of pending cases where substantial amounts of electronic data
are being sought, each side has chosen to incur the expense of retaining experts who specialize
in document retrieval,").
305. See id. (discussing situations in which litigants agree to limit scope of electronically
stored data discovery).
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For example, in one recent case, the court ordered the parties to an elec-
tronic data discovery dispute to follow the terms of a cost-allocation agree-
ment between the parties of a related case."° The related cost-allocation
agreement required the defendant, at its own cost, to restore a sampling of the
requesting backup tapes from each category of tapes that was identified as
possibly containing relevant data." The defendant, however, had the right
to seek reimbursement from the plaintiffs up to twenty-five thousand
dollars."°r Furthermore, the parties in the related case had agreed that "any
further production of electronic mail back-up tapes [would] be allowed only
upon 'good cause shown by the [plaintiff.]'""' As this example illustrates, if
parties are able to arrive at agreements regarding the allocation of discovery
costs of electronically stored data on their own, they may be able to draft
agreements that are much more creative and appropriate to their individual
needs in the particular case than if they relied on a court to make such a
determination. Regardless of what the parties actually agree upon, if the
judiciary and the legal community encourage litigants to address electronic
data discovery issues as early as possible, they thereby will promote more
equitable allocations of electronic data discovery costs and will decrease the
number of discovery battles that litigants wage before the courts.
V Conclusion
It is evident that numerous problems exist involving the allocation of
electronic data discovery costs. These problems stem primarily from the sheer
breadth of the rules and lack of guidance that the current rules of discovery
provide.31 In addition, the apparent lack of technical knowledge and practical
understanding of computer related issues among much of the judiciary further
306. SeeLinnenv. A.H. Robins Co., Inc.,No. 97-2307,1999WL 462015, at *6-*7 (Mass.
Super. June 16, 1999) (requiring plaintiff to adhere to discovery agreement in related case and
deciding to await outcome of that discovery process before addressing requests for further
information). In Linnen, the plaintiff sought discovery of e-mail messages stored on the defen-
dant's backup tapes. Id. at *1. The defendant estimated the cost to restore the data contained
onthe backup tapes at between $1,150,000 and $1,750,000. Id. at *4. The court found that the
current action raised issues that a related action in which the defendant was also a party had
raised. Id. In that related action, the parties came to an agreement regarding the discovery of
the electronically stored data sought. Id. at *5. Therefore, the court required the parties in the
present action to abide by the terms of the agreement reached in the related action. Id. at *6-*7.
Furthermore, the court decided to await the outcome of the discovery process under way in the




310. See supra Part IID (discussing current discovery rules and problems surrounding
those rules).
57 WASH. &LEE L. REV 257 (2000)
compounds the problems.3 1 ' The relevant decisions in which courts have con-
sidered the proper allocation ofthe costs of electronic data discovery evidence
these problems. 2
In order to remedy these costly problems, judges should utilize specific
guidelines when making electronic data discovery allocation decisions. The
Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should incorpo-
rate the aforementioned guidelines into its notes to the current discovery rules
in order to better address the unique issues surrounding the allocation of
electronically stored data discovery costs.31 3 Furthermore, the legal commu-
nity should encourage the judiciary to become better educated and more
informed regarding technical issues involved in electronic data discovery deci-
sions." 4 This increased knowledge will enable the judiciary to make more
just and equitable decisions regarding electronic data discovery requests.
Finally, the legal community and the judiciary should encourage litigants to
address these costly issues at the onset of the litigation process so that they
will be better prepared and better informed regarding the potential electroni-
cally stored data discovery issues involved in their suits. 31s Such preparedness
will facilitate agreements between parties concerning the allocation of elec-
tronically stored data discovery costs. Regardless of exactly what is done to
remedy these problems, it is evident that absent significant changes, the
problems will only worsen with time. Thus, it is all too clear that the time has
come to bring the judiciary and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure into the
computer age.
311. See supra Part liD (discussing problems surrounding current discovery rules and
judiciary's lack of technical knowledge in applying those rules in situations involving electronic
data discovery).
312. See supra Part ill (discussing and analyzing relevant case decisions).
313. See supra Part IVA (suggesting that Advisory Committee incorporate specific guide-
lines regarding electronic data discovery issues into Rules of Civil Procedure).
314. See supra Part IVJ3 (discussing need for judges to become more informed regarding
electronic data discovery issues).
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